

CURRENT History

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

JANUARY 1963

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CURRENT History

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY
The New York Times

PUBLISHED BY
Current History, Inc.

EDITOR, 1943-1955:
D. G. Redmond

JANUARY, 1963
VOLUME 44 NUMBER 257

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

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Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing office. Indexed in *The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1963, by Current History, Inc.

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CURRENT History

JANUARY, 1963

VOL. 44, NO. 257

In this issue, eight specialists evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the new African nations. Our introductory article analyzes in detail the forces working against African unity and the forces pulling the African states together. How strong is Pan-Africanism?

Pan Africanism: African Odyssey

By JOHN CRUTCHER

Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, United States Department of State

PAN-MOVEMENTS are well-known to the modern world,¹ but none besides Pan-Africanism has spread so rapidly and reached such intensity over as large an area as the African continent. Ideas of African personality, African democracy, African socialism, and African unity have attained unprecedented popularity. Organizations claiming to be based upon these ideas have sprung up in great number and variety. During this era of African history in which colonial rule is ending, Africa is undergoing a Proteus-like transition in search of an identity and stable institutional forms expressive of it.

Many of the ideas regarded as Pan-African originated long ago and developed independently of one another. Pan-Africanism itself,

however, belongs to this century; for the first Pan-African Congress was convened in London by H. Sylvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer, in 1900. Dr. W. E. B. Dubois, revered as the father of Pan-Africanism but now a self-proclaimed Communist, participated in the Congress as chairman of its Committee on Address to the Nations of the World. He went on to organize five Pan-African congresses from 1919 to 1945, all of which met outside of Africa.

Before the last world war most of those interested in Pan-Africanism were United States Negroes and West Indians. For them Dubois' rivalry with the Jamaican Marcus Garvey was a dominant feature of the early 1920's. Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association advocated racial purity and "Back to Africa" for American Negroes, its 1920 convention designated Garvey Provisional President of the African Republic. Garvey spoke often of his political vocation to redeem Africa, and he set up what his followers regarded as a government in exile. His African Orthodox Church preached of a black God, Christ, and Madonna.² Dubois, on the other hand, was a mulatto and a founder and leader of the N.A.A.C.P. He promoted self-

¹ See Hans Kohn, "Pan-Movements," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XI (New York: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 545-554. For the history and meaning of Pan-African ideas see George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism," *Journal of African History*, I, 2 (1960); George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* (New York: Roy, 1956); and Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism* (New York: Praeger, 1962). Over half of Legum's useful book is constituted by appendices of the important Pan-African documents.

² See Edmund David Cronon, *Black Moses* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955).

determination by Africans under their own leadership. His ideas, less evangelistic than Garvey's, appealed more to intellectuals.

By 1945, at the Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England, Africans were emerging as leading figures of the Pan-African movement. Such men as Kwame Nkrumah were soon to make African unity the most widely accepted idea in Africa. Nkrumah, who has acknowledged Garvey's writings as the dominant source of his enthusiasm, brought Ghana to independence in 1957 and thus initiated the rush that has brought over 20 more African countries to independence. He maintains that at Manchester "*African nationalism*" superceded "*black nationalism*" as the active political force, but he has not given up the idea that the liberation of Africa affords "hope of freedom and equality . . . for people of African descent in any part of the world."³

MEANING AND OBJECTIVES

Pan-Africanism raises a number of fundamental problems. There are questions of its content: do Pan-Africanists share a common perception or is the term meaningless; if a common perception underlies the diverse ideas they propagate, what is it essentially? More specific questions concern the competition among persons and organizations as to which represent Pan-Africanism: questions of legitimacy and power.

African leaders often use Biblical as well as liberal and Marxist terminology to express the idea that Africa and its people are in some way special. They say that the African mass is equal to other peoples and races; that it

³ *Ghana* (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1959), pp. 36, 37, 44. See also Cronon, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185; and *Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 73.

⁴ See Thomas Hodgkin, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism," in *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 10, *African Affairs*, No. 1 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961), pp. 22-40. Joseph Ki-Zerbo of Upper Volta writes: "the Negro has been the proletarian among nations." "African Personality and the New African Society," in *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 278. On the elect see Ch. 3, "Prophets and Priests," in Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 1957), as well as the works cited in fn. 1-3 above.

constitutes, as it were, a world proletariat; or that the ancestors have produced a people chosen by God to fulfill a great historical mission.⁴

The essence of what many of these leaders express in various ways is that before colonialism Africa was an integral being not yet perfected; under colonialism Africa suffered a kind of exile and passion in which it was divided, enslaved, and humiliated by alien peoples, but also steeled and introduced to modern ideas; and with the Pan-African national-independence movement Africa has its own exodus, regeneration, and salvation, by which the original independence and unity is regained at a higher level.

This conception of three stages is important, for the third era of African history is considered the one in which Africa is achieving its ultimate destiny. This era extends back into the declining period of colonialism, covers the immediate post-colonial period, and projects into the future. Pan-Africanism is regarded as the essential characteristic of this era: it carries an interpretation of African history, prescriptions as to what is to be done now, and predictions concerning Africa's destiny. It is the meaning embodied by African institutions in the process of their formation and the expression of the form of modern African politics. Many African leaders and intellectuals regard nothing less than the whole of Africa as a proper unit of intelligibility and action; and therefore our understanding of these representatives of modern Africa requires a consideration of Pan-Africanism not in terms only of the objective-possibilities of African unity but of what kind of unity they have in mind and why they think it good or necessary.

Some of the reasons given by African leaders for the need of African unity are these: it will secure Africa from the dangers of re-imposition of colonialism and of economic and cultural dependence on non-African powers, give Africa a strong and respected voice in world affairs, overcome tribalism and Balkan-like conflicts, spur economic development, facilitate the exchange and assimilation of new yet Africanized ideas, and restore to Africans

the peace and happiness of being at one with their brethren.

Even a measure of consensus on such general objectives, which not all African leaders would accept, does not forestall disagreement when the attempt is made further to specify them or to determine the means for effecting them. Some African leaders give first priority to their own countries and seek the gradual creation of African unity on the basis primarily of interstate cooperation, but others want the more rapid implementation of political integration.

INSTITUTIONAL EMBODIMENTS⁵

A number of African leaders and countries represent what is often referred to as militant or radical Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah calls Ghana, which serves as the title of his autobiography, "the symbol and the inspiration of renascent Africa." He has often stated that "Ghana's freedom would be meaningless if it was not linked up with the total liberation of the entire continent."⁶ "Nkrumahism" is attractive to many Africans outside of Ghana, and the leaders of some countries have sharply distinguished their ideas on African unification and cooperation from it.

President Sekou Touré of Guinea, with less emphasis on the political, regards Pan-Africanism only as "a means of development, a force of inter-African cooperation" that is necessary to rectify "the unjust nature of the relationship between the underdeveloped

African nations and the economically strong nations."⁷ He, too, is generally described as "radical."

Nigerian Governor-General Azikiwe, who in recent years has been considered much less radical, maintains that "Pan-Africanism should be concretised either in the form of regional states or one continental state . . . without upsetting the total sovereignty of the States concerned." "The constitutional implications of Pan-Africanism," Azikiwe asserts, "present to its builders a challenge to create a heaven on earth for African humanity."⁸

Many leaders are spoken of as moderate or even conservative. One, Prime Minister Balewa of Nigeria, last year wrote: "National unity is, naturally, uppermost in our minds, as it is self-evident that planning and prosperity can thrive only in conditions of peace and orderliness." He goes on to say, however, that while Africa has first priority in "external affairs," Nigeria is sensible enough "to distinguish between ideals and reality," being "attracted by plausible expressions of Pan-Africanism."⁹

President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, after having asserted that with regard to Pan-Africanism "no two African states can agree on the terms," added: "To speak of African unity in the face of existing economic and social disunity is to avoid the central task," which is "the earliest possible economic and social betterment of our people." Denying that "the formation of nebulous political units" should be allowed to dilute "the national will, once unified," he even suggested "as an alternative to Pan-Africanism the homely word cooperation."¹⁰ Similarly, President Leopold Senghor has said that Senegal prefers "not so much a pan-African as an inter-African policy," for it accepts "the frontiers of African states the way they are."¹¹

Many political parties have been Pan-African in aspiration or structure. In 1949, Nkrumah established the C.P.P. in the former Gold Coast as a Pan-African party "promoting unity of action among the peoples of Africa and of African descent." The constitution adopted by the new Tanganyika African National Union in 1954 anticipated African

⁵ See Erasmus H. Kloman Jr., "African Unification Movements," and Carol A. Johnson, "Political and Regional Groupings in Africa," in *International Organization*, XVI, 2 (Spring, 1962). This issue, which also contains an article by Rupert Emerson on "Pan-Africanism," is devoted entirely to "Africa and International Organization," on which subject an excellent bibliography is provided.

⁶ *I Speak of Freedom* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 47, 133.

⁷ "Africa's Future and the World," *Foreign Affairs*, 41, 1 (October 1962), 147.

⁸ *The Future of Pan-Africanism* (London: Nigeria High Commission, 1961), pp. 3, 13.

⁹ "Nigeria Looks Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 41, 1 (October 1962), 131, 136.

¹⁰ "African Problems and the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 40, 1 (October 1961), 50-51.

¹¹ "West Africa in Evolution," *Foreign Affairs*, 39, 2 (January 1961), 242. See also Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 137-145.

desire for an East African federation, which the Union had opposed under European auspices. The *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (R.D.A.), an inter-territorial party in former French West and Equatorial Africa, remains an important force in African politics. Founded in 1946 and allied with the French Communist party until about 1950, it has been the home organization of a generation of French-speaking African leaders and the basis of their camaraderie. Despite their differences, they cherish their common participation in it.

Many "all-African" organizations have been established to unite African efforts at various levels.

The All-African People's Conference (A.A.P.C.) and Conference of Independent African States (C.I.A.S.) are manifestations of the African surge to independence and unwillingness to accept the political independence of one's own country as a sufficient achievement. They were appropriately initiated in Ghana, the first tropical African colony to achieve independence and thus an inspiration to the others.

Organizations of a functional or professional nature also operate over large areas of Africa. Important functional organizations for cooperation between governments are the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Joint Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara and the Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara. Some 45 trade union organizations were represented at Casablanca in May, 1961, and here the All-African Trade Union Federation (A.A.T.U.F.) was organized. Leaders who rejected the A.A.T.U.F. requirement that members disaffiliate from world trade union organizations were instrumental in planning the Dakar conference, which created the much larger African Trade Union Confederation last January. The Pan-African Union of Journalists was created by delegates from nine African countries meeting at Bamako, Mali, in May, 1961. The Pan-African Youth Congress of last April drew

delegates from 35 African states and territories to the Guinean capital of Conakry, where the permanent headquarters of a Pan-African Youth Movement was established. Finally, the first All-African Women's Conference was held in Dar es Saláam, Tanganyika, last July.

Ideas for regional North (Maghreb), West, and East Central African unities are very popular in Africa. Some leaders promote regional unity chiefly as an intermediary stage in the creation of continental unity, but others stress regional cooperation primarily as a benefit to their own countries. A united Maghreb has long been the aspiration of many North African leaders, and the recent independence of Algeria lends intensity to the desire. Here Pan-African and Pan-Arab movements converge, for Islam and Arabism are common sources of the desire for unity. The Algerian nationalists proclaimed their revolution "an integral part of the Arab and African Revolution."¹² Premier Ben Bella has announced that Algeria will work toward the political and economic unification of the Maghreb and actively participate in African affairs, an earnest of this interest being its aid to the Angolan rebels.

Three Tunisian and Moroccan parties signed the first Maghrebian Charter in 1945. It was, however, April, 1958, before Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians reaffirmed at their Tangiers Conference that their goal is a Maghreb federation. Tunisia's constitution imposes the duty of realizing a Greater Maghreb. Morocco and Algeria assert that their dispute over Tindouf should not be allowed to endanger Maghrebian consolidation. But expressed intentions have led to no concrete plans.

One of the first attempts to create a West African federation failed. The Mali Federation, comprising Senegal and Soudan (not Mali Republic), broke up in August, 1960, two months after it became independent. It originally was to include Dahomey and Upper Volta, but they joined the Ivory Coast and Niger to form the *Conseil de l'Entente* in 1959.

The chief exponent of West African unity

¹² Quoted by Jacques Baulin, *The Arab Role in Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962), p. 113.

as a stage in the development of All-African unity has been Nkrumah. Years ago he planned a "Union of West African Socialist Republics." However, on July 1, 1961, the Union of African States (U.A.S.) was formally inaugurated on the basis of a decision reached by Ghana, Guinea, and Mali in December, 1960, and embodied in a formal charter in April, 1961. While the constitutions of the three states allow for the abrogation of their sovereignty in the creation of larger African states, so far the U.A.S., which is conceived of in the charter as "the nucleus of the United States of Africa," has consisted of some cooperation between the three countries in various fields and attempts to harmonize their domestic and foreign policies.

In East, Central, and Southern Africa the movement for unity has been growing. Julius Nyerere, head of the Tanganyika African National Union, offered several times to delay Tanganyika's independence, if Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika could come to independence together as a federation. He was an organizer of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (P.A.F.M.E.C.A.), which was started at Mwanza, Tanganyika, in September, 1958. P.A.F.M.E.C.A. has thought of itself as a regional organization of the A.A.P.C. At Addis Ababa last February the fourth P.A.F.M.E.C.A. Conference resolved "to establish a Federation of the Component Independent States of P.A.F.M.E.C.A. as a first real and logical step toward the full realization of total African political unity," beginning with the creation of an East African federation embracing Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar as soon as they are all independent. It called for immediate discussions on extending the East African Common Market and Common Services Organization to include Ethiopia and Somalia. The Conference accepted delegates from Southern African countries, expressed the intention that Central and Southern African countries be included in the East African federation upon their independence, and changed the name of the group to Pan-African Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa.

AFRICAN COUNTRY BLOCS

Certainly the most ambitious undertakings in pursuit of African unity have taken the form of multi-purpose country groups. The largest of these is the Monrovia-Lagos group, which has as its core the Brazzaville group. The smaller Casablanca bloc includes the U.A.S.

Within the Brazzaville group is the *Conseil de l'Entente*, a customs union having a Solidarity Fund through which the Ivory Coast aids three poorer countries (Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta), and the Equatorial Customs Union (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon). This bloc of twelve French-speaking countries (Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, and the Entente and Equatorial states) came into existence in December, 1960. President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast had convened all but Cameroon at Abidjan the preceding October to consider the Algerian question. Following the Brazzaville Conference, the twelve established the *Organisation Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique* at Yaounde, Cameroon, in March, 1961; and in September at Tananarive, Madagascar, they adopted the Charter of the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (U.A.M.). Specialized organizations of the U.A.M. now include a defense and a postal and telecommunications union. A permanent secretariat represents the U.A.M. at the United Nations in New York. A going concern, the U.A.M. is elaborating plans toward more concrete, efficient, and permanent cooperation.

The Casablanca group (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, United Arab Republic) was formed in January, 1961. Proclaiming non-alignment, the Casablanca Charter supported Lumumba in the Congo and Morocco's claim to Mauritania, and it denounced any French-initiated consultations and referendum on Algeria. It avowed the group's determination to liberate the remaining colonial territories in Africa by aiding them. Affirming its desire for cooperation and unity among African states, the group decided that a permanent consultative assembly in which all African states are repre-

sented should be created as soon as possible. In May, 1961, a protocol was concluded on the implementation of the Charter's provisions for three permanent functional committees (political, economic, and cultural), a joint military high command, and a liaison office.

Leaders of the U.A.M. and Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia met in Monrovia, Liberia, in May, 1961. The main purpose of the Conference was to bring together the heads of independent African states. Nigeria's Prime Minister Balewa has written that "it was agreed that unaligned countries like Nigeria and Liberia and two members of the Brazzaville and Casablanca states respectively should summon a conference in Monrovia to resolve their differences.

Unfortunately, some African states who were co-sponsors of this conference withdrew at the last moment, leading to a process by which the mediating group has now been labelled as partisan under the appellation of the 'Monrovia-Lagos' group."¹³ The two Casablanca sponsors were to have been Guinea and Mali. Sudan, in deference to Morocco's objection to Mauritania's attendance, declined to come; and Congo (Leopoldville) had not been invited in order to avoid a credentials dispute. The Conference resolved to oppose political integration of sovereign African states and acceptance of any one leader in the promotion of continental co-operation. It decided upon an economic conference at Dakar, Senegal, to work out details of the forms of cooperation and designated Lagos, Nigeria, as the site of the next heads-of-state conference.

The Dakar Conference was held in July, and in January, 1962, 20 states convened at Lagos. Libya and Tunisia, which participated at Monrovia, as well as the Casablanca states and Sudan, did not attend because the provisional government of Algeria had not been invited; but Congo (Leopoldville) and Tanganyika supplemented the other 18 Monrovia countries. The Lagos Conference approved in principle a Charter for an Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization

(I.A.M.S.O.). Azikiwe, in opening the Conference, noted that the lack of a Casablanca declaration recognizing the right of African states to equality, self-determination, freedom from interference and subversion, and territorial inviolability constitutes a fundamental "ideological" difference between the Monrovia-Lagos and Casablanca countries.

There was considerable apprehension that the Lagos Conference had hardened divisions between the Arab and sub-Saharan countries and between the Lagos and Casablanca blocs. But 1962 witnessed some erosion of these divisions. As the year wore on it quickly became evident that African leaders, who were carrying on discussions across bloc lines, desired a reconciliation and that plans were beginning to take shape toward that end. Mali and particularly Guinea have been active in exploring means of reconciling differences with U.A.M. and Monrovia-Lagos countries. Ghana has given some indication of willingness to participate in these developments.

A number of important African issues bear directly on the chances for overcoming Africa's present division into blocs. Most of them blur distinctions between the group rather than divide them. Many Africans have expressed uneasiness over the continuing estrangement between Senegal and Mali and between Nigeria and Ghana. The split between Senegal and Mali finished off the Mali Federation and the two countries have had opposite positions on Morocco's claim to Mauritania. Both countries, however, have expressed interest in settling their differences, although they have recognized that they would be able more easily to associate within a larger group.

The Ghana-Nigeria problem is indeed difficult. Nigeria was host to the Lagos Conference and its immense size and population make it an important state. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was leader of the opposition Action Group party in the federal House of Representatives, has been brought to trial for treason by the Nigerian Government. Awolowo for the last few years has openly adhered to Nkrumah's ideas on Pan-African-

¹³ "Nigeria Looks Ahead," *loc. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

ism, and charges have been made implicating Nkrumah in the alleged Awolowo conspiracy to overthrow the government of Nigeria. A virulent newspaper battle has been conducted between the two countries.

The question of African association with the European Economic Community lies between the English-speaking countries of both groups and the remaining African countries. The 18 African countries that last year renewed their association with the Common Market include Mali, a Casablanca country. Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanganyika have been vociferous opponents of African association with the E.E.C. and have favored the creation of an African common market. Last October, Ghana submitted to the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade a treaty drawn up by the Casablanca group for such a market. Ghana and a few other African countries assert that an African common market would be an alternative to association with E.E.C., but some of the U.A.M. countries have expressed support for the idea of an African market without renouncing continuing association with the E.E.C.

Another issue between the groups has been that of relations with the Communist bloc. The Casablanca countries have accepted closer relations than the U.A.M. countries; but Niger, Dahomey, Senegal, and Cameroon signed cooperation agreements with Communist countries last year and in October, Senegal was the first U.A.M. country to accept Soviet diplomatic representation. At Libreville, Gabon, last September the U.A.M. supported U Thant's Congo reunification plan, called for the expulsion of South Africa and Portugal from the United Nations, and withdrew sponsorship of Mauritania's bid for a United Nations Security Council seat.

These moves brought U.A.M. policy more into line with that of some other Lagos states and of the Casablanca bloc. At the same time Guinea, the only territory voting *non* in de Gaulle's September, 1958, referendum, has, since the emergence of some strains in its relations with the U.S.S.R. and the conclusion of the Evian accords, initiated moves towards

establishing closer relations with France, thus coming nearer the U.A.M. position.

It now appears that an all-African conference of the heads of state of both the Monrovia-Lagos and Casablanca groups will take place this spring at Addis Ababa. The two-week visit of President Houphouet-Boigny in Guinea last October was one in a series of state visits between countries of the two groups. African unity was the keynote of each visit, and expectations rose to a high pitch at the end of 1962. The Casablanca group discussed meeting in December at Marrakech, Morocco, before the twice-postponed third C.I.A.S., this time at foreign-minister level, planned for Tunis in January, 1963. Presumably the Lagos countries will ratify the Charter of the I.A.M.S.O. in the Ethiopian capital before the reconciliation meeting.

The question of whether Pan-Africanism is a racial or geopolitical concept has been subject to avid debate. It is often said that the racial ideas of Pan-Africanism are the province of French-speaking Africans like Leopold Senghor, whose concept of *negritude* is meant to express what all Negroes hold in common by virtue of their "Negroness." But, as do other English-speaking Africans, one Nigerian politician regards Pan-Africanism as "racial consciousness" and another expresses the fear lest its "continentalization" have "the effect of destroying the racial basis and thus what is possibly the fundamental basis for Pan-Africanism."¹⁴ Conversely, North Africans have been aware that "purely Arab nationalism" entails the danger of help-

(Continued on page 53)

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¹⁴ *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered*, pp. 121, 145.

Discussing Nasser's interpretation of Arab socialism as applied to the United Arab Republic, this author warns that "Nasser's program for the improvement of Egyptian living standards is foredoomed to failure, whatever the success of industrialization and recovery of waste lands, if Egypt's population continues to increase at the present rate. With continued improvement in public health as well as in individual incomes, the current rate of a three per cent annual increase in population is likely to keep up with, if not actually to overrun, improvements in the economy within a few years."

Arab Socialism in the U. A. R.

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

*Senior Specialist in International Relations, Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress*

DURING THE early years of the revolutionary regime in Egypt, the energies of the coterie of young nationalist officers who had liberated the country from a stagnant monarchical system were everywhere in demand. On the one hand, there was an urgent need to replace a worn-out governmental structure with one adapted to a poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, overpopulated country possessed of few natural resources. On the other, was the exciting prospect of exploiting a surge of pan-Arab enthusiasm for a political union under Egyptian leadership of at least some of the several Arab countries.

As between the two lines of endeavor, leaders of the junta were more attracted to the second both by a broad sense of historic mission and by a disinclination to become submerged completely in a slough of economic and social problems for whose solution they had no adequate formulae. Moreover, by the very nature of Egypt's position in the world—a very sensitive position relative to contemporary world problems—assiduous attention to foreign relations was a necessity of the first order. Yet the amount of energy dissipated during the early years of the revolu-

tionary regime by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his associates in an effort to establish Egyptian leadership in the Arab world would appear to indicate their hope of finding in a political grouping of Arab states—particularly if this should include one or more of the oil-rich countries—a means of alleviating some of the economic ills plaguing the life and sapping the vigor of Egypt. Whatever may have been the nature of the junta leader's original hopes and intent, it became clear soon after the July 14, 1958, coup in Iraq that, beyond the willingness of Syria and Yemen to enter into association with Egypt, the immediate outlook for Arab political integration was not bright.

It is true that the political facade created by the merging in 1958 of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic, modestly embellished by the association of Yemen in a loose structure called the United Arab States, gave a brief impulse to pan-Arab sentiment. This enthusiasm dwindled rapidly, however, with the widening realization that the readiness of these two states to join with Egypt was due more to their own local situations than to zeal for Arab unity. In the case of Syria, union with Egypt was sought to avert the threat of Communist takeover. Yemen sought to ac-

quire an ally in its effort to expel the British from Aden. Since rival interests elsewhere in the Arab world precluded the likelihood of further accretional growth, the President of the United Arab Republic could no longer postpone an attempt to make good on revolutionary promises to improve the institutional and economic life of the Egyptian nucleus whose shortcomings as a viable state were all too manifest.

The task he faced was such as to call for a combination of economic common sense, social idealism and administrative acumen such as is found only rarely among leaders of state. Fundamental to the situation was the fact that in a country still largely dependent on agriculture, whose boundaries embraced an area of some 386,000 square miles, 98 per cent of the land was quite unsuited for crop raising. Thus in an area hardly as large as that occupied by Israel, where a population of two million lives in something less than affluence, Egypt's 28 million must struggle to find means of subsistence. This desperate situation was compounded by the fact that, whatever measures might be devised in the years ahead for increasing the arable portion of the land, they could hardly be expected to improve living prospects for the fellahin, whose fecundity thus far has promised to keep abreast of any land improvement projects. Barring the discovery of a cheap and practical method of desalting sea water, Nasser's promise to double the national income within a decade will be achieved, if at all, by means other than expanding the potentialities of agriculture.

An alternative means of effecting a basic improvement in the economy obviously has consisted in the development of industry. In embarking on an intensive industrialization program as a major feature of domestic policy, President Nasser hoped to achieve various desirable results. Industry was expected to absorb substantial portions of the country's surplus population. Manufactured goods, it was thought, would enable the government to diversify exports and thus to reduce excessive reliance on fluctuating income from the sale of cotton in uncertain foreign markets.

Furthermore, it was supposed that industry would attract the investment of the wealthy and thus lessen the need for foreign capital while weakening the hold of foreign interests on the Egyptian economy.

THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN

These ideas were put to the test. The second Five Year Plan, inaugurated in 1960, called for the setting up of more than 700 new industrial undertakings. Some foreign capital necessarily was to be sought for this ambitious program in keeping with an investment pattern indicative of Egypt's "positive neutrality." In the event, about two-thirds of the contracts for foreign participation in the industrial program were made with Western concerns, headed by those in West Germany, but the plan was thrown somewhat out of gear by the fact that very little Egyptian private capital was forthcoming. Egyptian money still sought investment in stable foreign countries or in non-industrial channels, such as real estate, at home. The disillusionment and pique stemming from this behavior on the part of the Egyptian capitalistic class had much to do with the elaboration of the socialistic patterns already becoming apparent in the measures taken by the chief of state for the sake of the public welfare.

The nationalization of Suez Canal operations in 1956 would hardly lie within a definition of socialism, yet it set a shining precedent for expropriation by the state of other foreign-owned properties in Egypt—banks, insurance companies, mercantile establishments, transportation facilities and shipping interests. These proceedings led on, in turn, to the partial or total taking over of privately owned properties and finally to the seizure of private wealth in almost every form on a progressive and ever-widening scale.

This trend was the result of no dogma or doctrine. In his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, Nasser set forth his conceit of a heroic role wandering about in search of a hero. He himself assumed this role with considerable distinction in expelling the British from the Suez Canal Zone, acquiring arms and armament from the Soviet Union, emerging vic-

torious after military defeat during the Suez crisis, and becoming, for many, the embodiment of pan-Arab nationalist sentiment. The empirical method employed in his attempt to create a stable economic and social order as underpinning for the political structure that he and his colleagues were erecting placed him in the new role of a revolutionist in search of a social ideology. The socio-economic scheme which emerged, being in its present formative stage a non-Marxist blend of capitalism and state socialism, is best described in Nasser's own idiom as "Arab socialism."

The effort to transform Egypt from a land where a veneer of wealth and vested interest adhered to a massive grey substructure of poverty into a land of more uniform consistency gained momentum with the start of the second Five Year Plan in 1960. The measure of success it may achieve will depend on a number of factors. Obviously, much will depend on gains from Egyptian industry. In 1962, the industrial outlook in most respects was bright. More and more domestic needs were being served by Egyptian manufactures. There was an ample supply of native labor. Increased petroleum production in Egyptian fields, together with hydro-electric expansion, met most of the power needs of industry. In the agricultural sphere, the opening of new fertilizer plants and increased use of insecticides gave promise of better yields for the future.

There were some doubtful elements in the situation, however. The sequestration of private wealth was a risky move, for the entrepreneurial class in Egypt not only possessed investment capital but it also embraced much of the managerial experience and ability to be found in the country. It is true that this was not wholly an indigenous element of the population, comprising as it did many Greeks, Italians, Lebanese and Jews, yet their financial ruin and exodus from Egypt in large numbers indubitably will have a blighting effect on many kinds of business transactions related to industrial growth. This effect will be the more serious because of the character of the government bureaucracy, long noted

for its sloth, inefficiency and resistance to innovation.

It is likely that the availability of foreign loans and credits will be found no substitute for resident skills and commercial enterprise. Increasing revenues from Suez Canal operations, amounting in 1961 to the substantial sum of \$150 million, can support only a minor part of a national budget calling (1962) for an expenditure of \$5.5 billion. It remains to be seen whether the previous level of national income can be maintained after the effects of socialistic decrees have taken hold.

POPULATION CONTROL

One thing, meanwhile, is certain. Nasser's program for the improvement of Egyptian living standards is foredoomed to failure, whatever the success of industrialization and recovery of waste lands, if Egypt's population continues to increase at the present rate. With continued improvement in public health as well as in individual incomes, the current rate of a three per cent annual increase in population is likely to keep up with, if not actually overrun, improvements in the economy within a few years.

President Nasser's growing awareness of this hazard is attested by the complete reversal of his former attitude toward state participation in education for population control. In May, 1962, the first Egyptian birth control conference was held in Cairo under his sponsorship. This notable event, followed by the setting up of birth control clinics, may be regarded as one of the most promising steps ever taken in the Land of the Nile toward the raising of the living standard of the fellah above the subsistence level. Much yet remains to be done in overcoming religious and social taboos, yet with the government fully enlisted in the cause of population control, Egyptians may be on the threshold of a better life.

FOREIGN POLICY

There is reason to believe that, once embarked on his program of reform in Egypt, Nasser may have become convinced that a generalized type of Arab socialism might have

a beneficial and regenerative effect if adopted widely in the Arab world and Africa. It is certain, in any event, that the attempt to apply Arab socialism by authoritarian methods in the Syrian Region had much to do with Syria's break-away from the United Arab Republic in September, 1961. Nevertheless, while the loss of Syria undoubtedly damaged Nasser's image in parts of the Arab world, the economic problems of the various non-aligned countries represented at the Cairo economic conference in July, 1962, highlighted by apprehension as to the probable effects on underdeveloped nations of the European Common Market, drew greater attention to the possible virtues of Arab socialism. It may yet prove to have political efficacy in Egyptian foreign relations.

In the meantime, other considerations have figured prominently in Egypt's relations with other Arab countries. With Syria estranged, Nasser could see no virtue in continued liaison with trouble-ridden Yemen. In December, 1961, that tie was severed. After the overthrow of the old order in September, 1962, however, Nasser regarded favorably Yemeni overtures for the resumption of a political tie. It was on the Yemeni front that the long-standing feud between President Nasser and King Hussein again attracted attention. Jordan's announced readiness to give armed support, on request, to the cause of the deposed Imam coincided with the arrival of Egyptian troops on Yemen's shore to aid the rebels.

Events in Yemen also brought to general notice the deteriorating relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hussein and Saud having concluded arrangements for a joint army command, Saudi forces were poised for aid to Yemeni tribesmen intent on restoring the monarchy. The Nasser-Saud vendetta has been fed by grievances on both sides. Nasser suspected Saudi complicity in Syria's defection from the U.A.R. Saud charged that Arab socialism violates Koranic principles. Bitter quarrels resulted from arrangements for the annual *haj*, or pilgrimage, to the Holy Cities. Five of the Saudi princes, paced by Prince Talal, an outspoken critic

of despotic rule in Arabia, recently were given asylum in Egypt. Such incidents inevitably contribute to a deterioration in intra-Arab relationships.

Syria's withdrawal from the United Arab Republic appears to have wrought little change in Egypt's external relations. Post-revolt relations with Syria itself have run the gamut from watchful waiting and a receptive Egyptian response to a tentative Syrian proposal for federal union in June, 1962, to mutual recrimination after Syria's abrupt withdrawal of the proposal. In August, Egypt threatened to withdraw from the Arab League because of Syria's charge of interference in its internal affairs. In Egyptian eyes, Syria's accusation was compounded by a bid for leadership in projects for Arab political unity.

Egypt's attitude toward Iraq cooled quickly after the July coup in 1958 because of Premier Kassim's refusal to accept Egyptian guidance. Relations were worsened by Egypt's support of Kuwait against Iraq's claim to the sheikhdom but were improved slightly by the withdrawal of the U.A.R. contingent from the Arab League's protective force in October, 1961. A year later Nasser was accused by the Iraqi foreign minister as being the "architect of Arab disunity." This view, by and large, was shared in Lebanon. In late years, Nasser has been on poor terms also with Iran because of the Shah's failure to halt the shipment of Iranian oil by the so-called Consortium (Iranian Oil Participants, Ltd.) to Israel.

Elsewhere within the range of Egyptian influence, the outlook at the close of the year 1962 was rather brighter. A visit by President Nasser to the Sudan in November, 1961, tended to improve the mutual regard of these states so closely connected by the umbilical cord of the Nile. A joint communiqué issued on that occasion recorded agreement on a policy of neutrality and non-alignment and an opposition to power politics in the Congo. The resumption of Egyptian diplomatic relations with Tunisia in August, 1961, after a three-year interval, removed an obstacle to the flow of Egyptian influence through most of Africa. The Nasser regime, having con-

sistently supported the Algerian revolutionists, found no fault with the Ben Bella faction. It did show some apprehension at the development of the Cuban crisis, however, perhaps not so much because of sympathy for a revolutionary government as because of a dread that further developments in a world power struggle might bring uncontrollable pressure to bear on the use of the Suez Canal.

Although accused by Syria of having modified its anti-Israel posture, the United Arab Republic has not relaxed visibly in unremitting hostility toward Israel. Studies have continued of ways in which the Arab boycott might be applied more effectively—this being the one cause to which all Arabs have been devoted sincerely. The unveiling of an Israeli nuclear reactor in 1960 was matched in 1961 by the completion, with Soviet aid, of an Egyptian atomic reactor. Israel's 50-mile weather-testing rocket was overmatched by a German-designed 400-mile multi-purpose Egyptian rocket. Meanwhile, Egypt's efforts have been redoubled to woo the emerging African nations through education, Afro-Asian organizational work, and propaganda picturing Israel as an agent of "imperialism."

Relations with the "imperialist" powers, while not to be described as cordial, in general have tended to improve of late. Diplomatic relations with Great Britain, ruptured at the time of the Suez crisis, were partially restored in 1959 and fully restored in January, 1961. Among the issues held over for adjustment was the matter of compensation to Britons whose Egyptian properties were seized in 1956. Settlement of these claims in August, 1962, paved the way for Britain's joining the United States and other allies in a program of aid to the U.A.R. With respect to France, two obstacles to cordial relations have been the Algerian War and French technical and arms aid to Israel. At the end of December, 1961, all French nationals, including at least 300 French teachers, were expelled from Egypt. French schools, which had been an important part of Egyptian educational facilities for generations, were taken over by the government. The Evian agreement relieved tensions slightly, as did the ac-

quittal early in April, 1962, of four French officials in Egypt on charges of espionage.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

The attitude of the Nasser government toward the United States has varied as circumstances have shifted. Two years ago an anti-Western mood prevailed in Cairo. This was owing in part to the belief that it would be politically astute to display an aversion to imperialism (old style) in a bid for favoritism in emergent Africa. At the third conference in Cairo of the All-African People's Organization in March, 1961, the United States was the chosen target for criticism. The continuation of various forms of United States aid through the year 1962, even in the face of vitriolic attacks by Egyptian press and radio, coupled with a relaxation in United States concern over these manifestations, led to visibly improving relations until, in September, an agreement to sell short-range defensive missiles to Israel brought a pause. Inasmuch as the United States maintains a policy of open support for Israel under most circumstances, the continued resistance of the United Arab Republic to communism within its own sphere must be taken as offsetting denunciations of Western "imperialism." As long as no barrier has been interposed to requests for continued American aid, relations between

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In this discussion of Sudanese economic and political development, the author observes that "the army's coup d'état of November, 1958," was welcomed by all groups except the Communists. The military government under General Ibrahim 'Abbud now "is stronger than ever." This scholar concludes that "in reality such an authoritarian government is more in the tradition of the Turkiya, Mahdiya and Condominium administrations in the Sudan than parliamentary democracy. . . . The government itself is not oppressive, and the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese appear content with it."

The Independent Sudan

By ROBERT O. COLLINS

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ONEW YEAR'S DAY, 1956, the flags of Britain and Egypt were hauled down all over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the blue, yellow and green flag of the Republic of the Sudan was raised in their place. Thus ended the Condominium, 57 years of British and Egyptian rule in the Sudan. This had begun after the overwhelming victory of General Kitchener in September, 1898, on the plains of Karari, and the subsequent collapse of the Mahdist State.

The Sudan is still today a vast and wild land. Ranging from the mountains and rain-forests of Central Africa in the south to barren deserts in the north, the country is dominated by the river Nile whose two great branches, the White Nile and the Blue, meet at Khartoum to flow northward to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Beyond the rivers the fertility of the soil depends directly on the amount of rainfall or the quantity of irrigated water taken from the rivers.

In the far north there is scarcely enough precipitation to provide sufficient grass for nomadic grazing. Further south, however, rainfall is more plentiful and interminable stretches of savannah grassland allow more dependable forage for cattle and sheep. In the north agriculture is confined to the banks

of the Nile and its tributaries and to selected irrigated areas. In the south where rainfall is abundant agriculture is carried on by numerous sedentary tribes practicing shifting cultivation on the fringes of the powerful Nilotic peoples who scorn farming and prefer to follow their cattle to seasonal grazing grounds.

The peoples of the Sudan are as diverse as their land. The Northern Sudan is dominated by Arabic culture and speech. Its inhabitants are Muslims. Most of the Northern Sudanese claim Arab descent, but there are large groups of non-Arab peoples like the Nubians, the Bija, and the Fur. The Southern Sudanese, however, are Negroid Africans neither claiming Arab descent nor adhering to Islam. Except for clusters of missionary-trained Christians and a limited number of Arabicized Muslims in the towns, the majority of the Southerners are pagans, speaking a multiplicity of African tribal languages.

Both the British and the Egyptians bequeathed valuable legacies to the new Republic of the Sudan. The British were clearly the senior partners in Anglo-Egyptian rule, and from the time when the governor-general, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated by Egyptian nationalists in Cairo in 1924 until the Anglo-

Egyptian Agreement of 1936, the British virtually excluded Egyptian participation in the administration. Thus throughout the Condominium the administration of the Sudan was dominated by the Sudan Political Service composed almost entirely of British officials recruited from Oxford and Cambridge or occasionally British military officers seconded from the Egyptian Army.

Mature, responsible, highly competent, and of impeccable character, these officials made the Political Service the finest colonial administration in the world. They rebuilt the Sudan from a land devastated by war, famine, and plague into a peaceful and prosperous state. They introduced Western education and technology, stamped out disease, and created a Sudanese civil service which, except for perhaps the Lebanon, is today the best in any country in the Middle East or Africa. Invariably preferring the company of tribal chiefs and hereditary sheikhs British officials at first elevated them to positions of responsible local administration. Ruling indirectly through these traditional authorities, the British ignored the small but vital urban middle class of Westernized Sudanese who, in the absence of the Egyptians, were ever more quickly recruited into the administrative bureaucracy.

By overlooking, frustrating, and even opposing the budding Sudanese élite the British officials antagonized that class on which the political developments of the Sudan were eventually to depend.

EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE

Egypt's contribution to the modern Sudan was less demonstrable and more complex. From 1899 to 1913 Egyptian money largely financed the rebuilding of the Sudan, and a host of Egyptian officials worked in subordinate posts and in technical positions to implement British plans for administration and development. With the strident increase of Egyptian nationalism after the First World War, however, the growing tension between

British and Egyptian officials was only relieved by the deportation of the Egyptians after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. Although evicted from the Sudan, the Egyptian government refused to abandon it. Egypt paid an annual subvention to the Sudan Defense Force and continued to export Egyptian culture. For over a century the Middle East has been undergoing a cultural renaissance led by Egypt, which today has become the virtual arbiter of Arab and Muslim culture.¹ Although excluded from the Sudan between 1924 and 1936, Egypt continued to have a colossal cultural impact on the Sudanese.

Egyptian cultural influence in the Sudan had begun with the Islamic missionary teachers of the eighteenth century, was continued throughout the nineteenth century by the more orthodox, legalistic 'ulama,' and has been sustained in the twentieth century by the press, radio, cinema and the ubiquitous Egyptian teacher. Although disinclined to listen to Egyptian claims of dominion, the Sudanese welcomed Egyptian cultural agents and willingly accepted their more beneficent cultural influences.


When the Egyptians returned to the Sudan after 1936, their political influence was revived but it never again dominated the Sudanese. Many Sudanese bitterly disliked Egyptian claims to unity of the Nile Valley and the vicious propaganda which accompanied them. Others were content to play the Egyptian game not so much from a desire to associate the Sudan with Egypt but to use the Egyptians as a lever to free the Sudan of British control. Until 1952, there seemed little to gain from this policy. Egyptian politicians insisted that Farouk was king not only of Egypt but of the Sudan as well. They refused to recognize Sudanese demands for self-government and self-determination and obstructed British attempts to implement them. Only after the Naguib-Nasser revolution of that year did the Egyptians abandon this short-sighted policy and agree to let the Sudanese choose their own future.

The emergence of the Sudanese came late in the history of the Condominium. Although there had been a budding nationalist move-

¹ Holt, P. M., *A Modern History of the Sudan*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1961, pp. 191-94.

ment (the White Flag League) in the early 1920's, it was guided and financed by Egyptian nationalists and collapsed after the removal of Egyptians from the Sudan in 1924. But the removal of Egyptian officials made way for the more rapid expansion of Sudanese to fill the vacuum. Spurred on by this demand for educated Sudanese, the intelligentsia grew rapidly in numbers, as well as restlessness, throughout the 1930's. The educated Sudanese soon found expression through the Graduates' General Congress established by the graduates of the Gordon College in February, 1938. At first the Graduates' Congress confined its interests to social and educational activities, but during World War II political feeling dramatically increased among the élite. In 1942, the Congress officially put forth its claim to act as the spokesman for Sudanese nationalism. When the Sudan government refused to recognize this claim, the Congress split into two groups: a moderate majority which was prepared to accept the good faith of the government, and an extremist minority led by Isma'il al-Azhari which, under the slogan "Unity of the Nile Valley," turned to Egypt. By vigor and demagoguery Azhari soon consolidated his influence throughout the towns and among the educated extremists. By 1943 his supporters had won control of the Congress and organized the Ashiqa' (Brothers), the first genuine political party in the Sudan. Seeing the initiative pass to the extremists, the moderates formed the Umma (Nation) party designed to co-operate with the British toward independence under the patronage of Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of the Mahdi.

Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman was the leader of the Ansar, the Mahdists, the great religious sect which had destroyed Egyptian rule in the Sudan in the nineteenth century and whose followers had been mowed down by Kitchener's gatling guns at Karari. He was a man of consummate ability and shrewdness. Rather than oppose the British administration, he pledged his all to Britain in both great wars and had been suitably rewarded by power and influence.



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As Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman's fortunes advanced, those of Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani seemed by comparison to decline. Sayyid 'Ali was the leader of the Khatmiyya sect, the great rival of the Ansar. The Khatmiyya had supported Egyptian administration in the nineteenth century, was eclipsed by Mahdism, but was revived during the Condominium and nurtured at first by the British who sought, in the early years of their administration, a counter-weight to the influence of Mahdism. Alarmed by the resurgence of the Mahdi and his followers, Sayyid 'Ali, although he personally remained aloof from politics, threw his support to Azhari and to Egypt whose dynastic history was so closely bound up with his own. At the same time Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman identified himself with the Umma and continued to co-operate with the British administration.

Thus there was a deep division of the Northern Sudanese. The competition between the Azhari-Khatmiyya faction, remod-

eled in 1951 as the National Unionist party (N.U.P.), and the Umma-Ansar group quickly rekindled ancient religious and dynastic rivalries which hitherto had been dying out in the younger generation. Fed by modern propaganda and the political jargon of nationalism, old suspicions and deep-seated hatreds were aroused to sour Sudanese politics for years and eventually to strangle parliamentary democracy in the Sudan.

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

This ever-widening political division was further exacerbated by increasing cultural tensions which cut across political and religious distinctions. Although the Sudanese élite were acquainted with Western culture through the medium of British education and the English language, the Western tradition remained alien to the vast majority of the intelligentsia. Essentially they had been swept up in the clash of cultural dislocation between their Muslim, Arab environment and their academic, technical education acquired in secondary schools and Western-oriented universities. While the problem of acculturation is not a unique theme in non-Western nations, the rapidity with which these social conflicts have come to the Sudan easily heightened political tension.

On February 12, 1953, the Co-domini, Britain and Egypt, at last agreed on self-government for the Sudan and self-determination by the Sudanese. Elections followed in November and December, 1953, and to the shock of many British officials and to the chagrin of the Umma party, Azhari's National Unionist party, which had campaigned for the unity of the Nile Valley, won an overwhelming victory. At once Egyptians, British, and many Sudanese interpreted this victory as a mandate to fashion some type of association between the Sudan and Egypt.

This soon proved, however, to be a grossly misleading interpretation. By voting for the N.U.P. the electors had expressed their wish for freedom from British control, not union with Egypt. Because the Umma had co-operated with the British, they were regarded by many as tools of the administration and

lacked national support. Many Sudanese were also highly suspicious of the dynastic ambitions of Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman if his party won control of the government.

It soon became clear to an astute politician like Azhari that a large and powerful segment of the Sudanese population, while anxious to end British rule, was also bitterly opposed to union with Egypt. In March, 1954, when President Nasser and Naguib visited Khartoum they were greeted by huge protests and demonstrations in which several people were killed. Then, in August, 1955, mutiny and rebellion swept through the Equatoria province of the Southern Sudan. The South comprises one-third of the Sudan's population and land area. The rebellion had numerous causes, among them the great racial, religious and linguistic differences between the Northern and the Southern Sudanese, but fundamentally it was a reaction to Northern, Arab domination in the government and administration of the Southern Sudan. Sobered by the realities of discontent and the responsibilities of political power and authority, Isma'il al-Azhari in an act of statesmanship disowned his campaign promises of union with Egypt and declared the Sudan an independent republic on January 1, 1956.

AN INDEPENDENT SUDAN

The parliamentary government which ruled the Sudan from 1956 to 1958 was an outgrowth of political developments since 1953. Ironically, when Azhari had ceased to support unity with Egypt and sought to lead the movement towards independence, his party, the N.U.P., lost its ideology and dissolved into factional infighting. Even before his declaration of independence he had lost a vote of confidence in the Legislative Assembly, and his position was only narrowly restored five days later. Even Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani and his Khatmiyya were becoming increasingly disenchanted with Azhari, whose personal quarrels with Sayyid 'Ali's lieutenants were hardly calculated to smooth over political differences. By June, 1956, the N.U.P. had split, and Azhari had broken with the Khatmiyya. With the support of Sayyid 'Ali,

who months before had held an unprecedented meeting with his arch-rival, Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman, a dissident faction of the N.U.P. formed the Peoples' Democratic party (P.D.P.) and on July 5, 1956, formed a coalition government with the Umma party in which Azhari was excluded from office.

'Abd Allah Khalil, a leading member of the Umma party, was elected prime minister and remained in power until the army *coup d'état* of 1958. The coalition of the Umma party and the P.D.P. was a cynic's delight. On every issue the two parties had opposite objectives. The Umma was friendly to Britain and the West. It wished to see Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Mahdi as a life-president of the republic. The P.D.P.'s policy was oriented toward Egypt which looked, in turn, to the Soviet bloc. Obviously, the Peoples' Democratic party could not tolerate the elevation of Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman at the expense of Sayyid 'Ali. The coalition was kept together only by a mutual desire to keep Azhari and the rump of the N.U.P., which had followed him into opposition, from coming to power. Political stability cannot be built on such opportunism.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Beside the factional strife in parliament, there were three major problems that beset the Sudan: economic development, the South, and relations with Egypt. The British left the Sudan with a sound economy. On the initiative of that notorious imperialist, Lord Kitchener, the Gezira, the island of fertile land lying between the Blue and the White Nile, was surveyed, and as early as 1900 plans began for the irrigation and growing of cotton. By 1905, there were nearly 24,000 acres under long staple cotton; so successful were these early experiments that the British government in 1919 guaranteed a loan of £6,000,000 for the construction of the Sennar Dam to provide the large amounts of water necessary to extend the irrigation of the Gezira.

The result was a unique experiment in social as well as economic planning. Today this provides the foundation of the Sudan's

economy and has created a prosperous, independent, landed peasantry. Three parties were to share in the development: the Sudan government, which was responsible for the construction and maintenance of the Sennar Dam and the major canals; the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, a private corporation originally founded by an enlightened Virginian, S. J. Leigh-Hunt, which was to manage the scheme; and some 26,000 tenants who provided the labor. The tenants, most of whom had some claim of ownership to the land, were each given 40 feddans (1 Sudanese feddan = 1.038 acres) in regular plots to facilitate irrigation. The cultivation was strictly controlled, and the profits shared 40 per cent each to the government and the tenants and 20 per cent to the syndicate. The Sennar Dam was completed in 1925 and by 1929 over 500,000 acres were under irrigated cultivation.

The Gezira scheme was an astounding success, but the fears of Egypt for the Nile waters, the restrictive Nile Waters Agreement of 1929, and the necessity for Britain to recognize Egypt as a partner in the Condominium prevented the British administration in the Sudan from unilaterally enlarging the Gezira. An independent Sudan Government was not bound by these limitations, and in 1956 plans were drawn up for the Manaqil Extension which would double the size of the Gezira. In May, 1957, the first stage was opened, but the filling of the main canal a year later without the prior consent of the United Arab Republic caused Egyptian-Sudanese relations to deteriorate. In 1962, the Manaqil Extension was completed, adding over 400,000 acres of irrigated cotton under cultivation.

The other great field of economic development in the Sudan is the increase in communications. The Sudan is a vast country of a million square miles embracing deserts, swamps, tropical rainforests, and high mountains. Reaching into the heart of Central Africa, the problem of transportation is the greatest single obstacle toward the development of the country. Although the Nile provides long stretches of navigable waterway, the expansive lands beyond the rivers

long remained isolated and cut off from the heart of government at Khartoum.

During the reconquest of the Sudan, Kitchener had constructed a military railroad which was quickly converted to civilian purposes. By December, 1899, the railroad stretched from Wadi Halfa to the Blue Nile, and in 1905 a line from Atbara to Port Sudan linked the Nile with that deep water harbor on the Red Sea. As the prospects for development in the Gezira improved, the railroad was extended up the Blue Nile to Sennar and then west to the White Nile and on to El Obeid in 1911. When smaller cotton-growing schemes developed in the Gash and the Baraka deltas, where streams rising in Eritrea vanish into the soil of the eastern Sudan, the railway was extended in 1924 eastward to Kassala and thence on to Port Sudan.

Depression, war, and political crises had discouraged the extension of the railroads south and west through Kordofan and into the Southern Sudan, but the independent Sudan was determined to unite the diverse parts of the nation and to tap these areas which are potentially wealthy in mineral and agricultural products. In April, 1959, the rail line from El Obeid to Nyala in Darfur was officially opened, and in 1962 the line was completed to Wau, the provincial capital of the Bahr al-Ghazal situated 1,400 miles from the nearest ocean outlet at Port Sudan. In the past six years the Sudan has laid over 750 miles of track, representing an increase of 35 per cent.

REMARKABLE PROGRESS

Indeed the economic development of the Sudan is its greatest achievement as an independent nation. Blessed with a competent civil service and a common sense which favors realistic and practical projects, the Sudanese through a combination of their own resources and those from foreign governments, the World Bank, and the United Nations have made remarkable progress.

² *Economic Survey, Research and Statistical Section, Economic Branch, Ministry of Finance, Khartoum.*

The Sennar Dam is soon to be electrified to provide additional power for the numerous light industries in the Khartoum area, including the largest cotton textile factory in the whole of Africa and the Middle East. The Sudan's Gross National Product (£S357.2 million in 1961) has kept pace with the growth of population. Investment has annually increased to a high level, totaling in 1961 a public and private investment of £S43.1 million. Actual government capital expenditure amounted to £S17.2 million in that year and will undoubtedly be considerably higher in 1962.

A poor cotton harvest in 1961 combined with large imports for development purposes created, however, a £S21.1 million deficit in the Sudan's balance of payments. While this large deficit is ostensibly a cause for alarm, the Sudan in fact used only £S4.8 million of its own reserves, for the remainder was covered by capital inflow from abroad. At the end of 1961 the Sudan's total reserves still stood at a healthy £S53.2 million in addition to 220,000 bales of cotton which represent potential foreign exchange earnings. The Sudan's sound economy has helped to cushion her political problems, and as long as cotton sells on world markets, the Sudanese should be able to keep pace with an expanding population and provide, with help from abroad, the investment necessary to develop their numerous resources.²

SUSPICIONS IN THE SOUTH

The second and more delicate problem facing the Sudan is the South. There are deep suspicions and latent hostilities between the Northern and the Southern Sudanese. During the nineteenth century many areas of the southern Sudan were decimated by slavers coming from the north. Hostile tribes, tenuous communications, a host of fatal diseases, and the somber loneliness all combined to prolong the conquest and pacification of the South until the late 1920's.

The British never really knew what to do with the South. Depression, war, and a general lack of money prevented rapid social and economic development, and until the

Southerners could compete with the more sophisticated Northern Sudanese, the British simply hoped to avoid exploitation by excluding undesirable Northerners from the South. This policy of exclusion soon became politically inadmissible. At a conference of British officials and Northern and Southern Sudanese representatives at Juba in 1947 the Southerners agreed to send delegates to the Legislative Assembly of a united Sudan, and the separate policy for the South was abandoned. Thus, just at the time when the pace of Sudanese nationalism quickened, the Southern Sudanese arrived on the political scene, largely uneducated, clearly unsophisticated, and predominately a tribalized people.

As the Sudan prepared for self-government and self-determination the wishes of the South were given little notice. The paternal but competent British administrators soon left, their places taken by alien and frequently unenlightened Northerners. Offended, confused and misunderstood by Northern politicians, the Southern Sudanese quickly revived old hatreds and suspicions. A spurious telegram touched off a mutiny in the Equatorial Corps in August, 1955, and disorder and rebellion spread throughout Equatoria. Nearly 300 Northern Sudanese were killed before the revolt was subsequently suppressed, but the restoration of order was long and difficult. The Sudan government is today determined to obliterate the cultural and educational differences between the North and the South and to assimilate the South to Arab, Muslim practices. Having once lost the confidence of the Southerners, however, it is doubtful that southern resentment and distrust will be washed away by such a policy.

RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

The third major problem facing the independent Sudan is its relations with Egypt. Sudanese foreign policy is neutralist, which does not prevent friendship with both the Soviet and Western blocs nor the taking of economic aid from either side. The Sudan plays a neutral role even in the Arab League, and its geographical remoteness from the problems of the other Arab states gives an

air of detached moderation to its policies. Only with Egypt has there been serious conflict. At first the latent tensions in Egyptian-Sudanese relations were concealed by the Suez crisis, but in 1958 the Egyptian government ineptly occupied two areas: one on the Nile, the other on the Red Sea, which had been administered by the Sudan since 1898. Only when the Sudan took the dispute to the United Nations Security Council did the Egyptians withdraw. But this petty quarrel was only the symptom of a much deeper conflict over the Nile waters. Many Sudanese had long claimed, quite rightly, that the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 gave little to the Sudan. The Egyptians were loath to give more, but since the construction of the High Dam at Aswan meant that a considerable area of the northern Sudan would be flooded, including the town of Wadi Halfa, some agreement had to be reached with the Sudan. Abortive negotiations were carried on intermittently from 1954 to 1958 when suddenly the whole political climate in the Sudan abruptly changed with the army's *coup d'état* of November, 1958.

Parliamentary government had first been held in high esteem in the Sudan. It was the symbol of nationalism and independence, a pubescent rite which signified the coming of age and freedom from alien rule. But at best parliament was a superficial instrument. It had been introduced into the Sudan at precisely the time when parliamentary forms were rapidly disappearing from other countries in the Middle East. Parties, the machinery by which parliamentary government functions, were not well organized groups with distinct objectives, but rather loose alliances attached opportunistically to personal interests and sectarian loyalties. Such groups were difficult to manage, almost impossible to direct. When the tactics of party management were exhausted, parliament became debased, benefiting only those politicians who reaped the rewards of power and patronage.

On the night of November 16, 1958, the commander-in-chief of the Sudan Defense

Force, General Ibrahim 'Abbud, sent 4,000 troops into Omdurman and Khartoum, seized the government buildings and radio station, placed the ministers under house arrest, and took charge of the government in a bloodless *coup d'état*. The following day 'Abbud himself broadcast to the nation blaming the "state of degeneration" on the political strife between rival factions. He dissolved all political parties, prohibited assemblies, and temporarily suspended newspapers. The country was henceforth governed by a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces consisting of 12 senior officers. Parliament was abolished, the transitional constitution suspended, and a state of emergency proclaimed.

Few in the Sudan mourned the passing of parliament. The mass of Sudanese had regarded the maneuvers of the politicians with bitter cynicism. Indeed, the prime minister, 'Abd Allah Khalil, appears to have urged the military to take over to counter the ever-growing Egyptian influence. The large political parties themselves did not oppose the coup. The leading politicians were pensioned off and in fact seemed quite willing to hand over the task of governing in which they had so lamentably failed. Both the great religious leaders, Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani and Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman, welcomed the army's seizure of power. Sayyid 'Ali could now retire from politics, which he had never liked, and on March 24, 1959, Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman died, depriving his followers of their active and respected leader.

Only the Communists opposed the coup. First organized in 1944 among the students in Cairo, the Communist party was a small but well-organized group who sought its supporters among the students and in the powerful trade union movement, particularly the Railway Workers' Union and the Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation. Under 'Abbud the Communists were dealt with severely.

Although the country as a whole accepted military dictatorship, the army did not. During the first year of army rule factions and personalities within the army struggled for control of the Supreme Council. 'Abbud

himself seemed above all this. A fatherly figure whose gentle demeanor and courtly manners impressed foreigners and charmed the Sudanese, he remained passive and quiescent. He preferred to act as Head of State while leaving the real power to the younger generals who vied for control of the Council. At first the Council was dominated by Major General Ahmad 'Abd al-Wahhab, second in command of the army, but in March, 1959, his control was challenged by two brigadiers, Muhyi ad-Din Ahmad 'Abd Allah and 'Abd ar-Rahim Shannan. On March 9, the two conspirators brought troops to Khartoum, momentarily gained control of the Council, and in May forced the "retirement" of 'Abd al-Wahhab.

Muhyi ad-Din and Shannan, however, did not secure their positions. They and their supporters were still a minority on the Council, and before the end of June the two brigadiers were arrested, accused of inciting mutiny, openly tried, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Several other officers were dismissed from the army and others demoted. One other attempted military coup took place in November when a young officer led a revolt in the Infantry School at Omdurman. The rising was quickly suppressed, and within a week the ringleaders were tried and executed. The executions sobered the Sudanese, who hitherto were proud of the bloodless method by which the 'Abbud government had seized and maintained power, and seem to have discouraged further attempts to take over the Sudan.

Once the internal struggles ceased, army rule brought rapid improvement in the Sudan's deteriorating economic position. The parliamentary government had always insisted on selling the cotton crop at a fixed price. Thus when cotton prices slumped on the world market in 1958, Sudan cotton went unsold at its unrealistic, high price. Nearly 250,000 bales were left unsold in 1958 with a second bumper crop expected in 1959. The 'Abbud government at once abolished the fixed price and within six months had sold all the Sudanese cotton. Although disposed of at lower rates, the ultimate effect

of the cotton sale was to give the Sudan a surplus revenue and dramatically rebuild the nation's foreign reserves.

The other great achievement of the military government was the conclusion of a Nile Waters agreement with the United Arab Republic. Negotiations were again resumed in October, 1959, after the parliamentary regime had broken off discussions in acrimony over a year before. Within one month agreement was reached, and a Nile Waters treaty was signed on November 8, 1959. The Sudan received £E 15 million compensation for the land at Wadi Halfa to be flooded by the High Dam. A fairer apportionment of the water was agreed upon, thereby paving the way for the construction of the Roseries Dam near the Abyssinian frontier to provide stored water for further large scale irrigation projects in the Sudan. But the Nile waters agreement is more far-reaching than the technical division implies. The United Arab Republic not only recognizes but appears to be reconciled to an independent Sudan. The Sudan will always be wary of her powerful neighbor to the north but, for the moment at least, she need not fear her.

After its first difficulties the military regime has proved extraordinarily stable. The threat of military *coup d'état* appears to have vanished and the only rumblings of discontent come from former politicians and members of the intelligentsia. Excluded from participation in government the educated élite are becoming increasingly restless and frustrated just as they were under British rule. In 1961, an Opposition Front was formed consisting of a motley collection of former parliamentary leaders, the two ex-premiers, Azhari and 'Abd Allah Khalil, and some Communists all under the patronage of the Mahdi's successor, Sayyid Siddiq 'Abd ar-Rahman. In July, 1961, the Opposition Front sent a telegram of protest to 'Abbud accusing him of terrorism and corruption. The leaders of the opposition were speedily placed under house arrest for seven months in far off Juba. When Siddiq 'Abd ar-Rahman died shortly afterward and was succeeded by Sayyid al-Hadi 'Abd ar-Rahman,

who was not inclined to politics, the Opposition Front collapsed.

A political truce appears to have been called between the Ansar and the government, and although the discontent and frustration of the intelligentsia have not yet found an outlet, the 'Abbud regime is stronger than ever. In reality such an authoritarian government is more in the tradition of the Turkiya, Mahdiya and Condominium administrations in the Sudan than parliamentary democracy. It is a government which the mass of Sudanese understand. They did not comprehend the complexities of the Western parliamentary tradition with its intricate machinery of parties, elections, and a loyal opposition. The government itself is not oppressive, and the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese appear content with it. Indeed an army of only some 13,000 men could hardly suppress disaffection among a population of 11 million scattered over a vast land. The complexities of the Sudan's geography and the ancient traditions of its peoples, not paper constitutions, are the strongest guarantees against oppression.

Thus the Sudan's greatest problems are neither economic nor political. They are cultural. The amalgamation of North and South, the growth of mutual understanding and respect between the educated Sudanese and their tribalized countrymen, and the success of acculturation between the Arab and the Western civilizations underlie the superficiality of day to day economic and political problems and can only be reconciled by time, patience and common sense. All of these qualities the Sudanese have in abundance.

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Discussing the coming of independence to Algeria in the summer of 1962, this specialist writes that independence has created deeper problems. "At the moment, rudimentary policy and goal outlines have been formulated. They are predicated upon a common experience—a national revolution, unprecedented in its magnitude and ferocity. . . . Thus dynamism and aggressiveness are to be the hallmarks of the government."

Algeria: The Plight of the Victor

By WILLIAM H. LEWIS

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ALGERIA'S BIRTH as an independent nation has been a profoundly painful experience. More than seven years of warfare have been followed by an unsettling and seemingly chaotic transitional period. Indeed, the signing of the Evian Accords on March 19, 1962, merely heralded a *rite de passage*. The bloody struggle for liberation has given way to the even more demanding struggle for survival.

Since independence on July 3, 1962, the mantle of leadership has fallen upon Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella who, together with a small coterie of ministers, army officers and parliamentarians, must place Algeria on the road to national reconstruction. The list of problems is long and the challenges confronting them are imposing. Algeria today is lacking in adequate numbers of trained and experienced administrators and technicians; it is without the cadres of security personnel which are vitally needed; it is desperately deficient in teachers, physicians, engineers, and other professional personnel of related calling. The economic profile of Algeria also reflects a disequilibrium of overwhelming magnitude: (1) in excess of 2 million Algerians are without employment; (2) essential industries and public services are not functioning; and (3) more than 2.5 million destitute *fellaheen* are returning to war rav-

aged lands without adequate food, shelter, seed, credit, or farm implements. Within the social sphere, this dynamic country of 9.5 million people, perched on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, faces difficulties of comparable dimension.

It is perhaps one of the major ironies of the Algerian revolution that, having part of its inception in a secret uprising against the one-man domination of Messali Hadj—leader of the M.T.L.D. (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties)—the seven and one-half year conflict should come to an end bringing to power a *Zaim*. The Arab concept of *Zaim* embraces all of the qualities of a chieftain, a leader and father of the people, the "intercessor for the masses before the Creator." The son of a small Arab landholder at Marnia, in the Oranie, Ben Bella was one of the six organizers of the November 1, 1954, rebellion. His career contains elements of the romantic, the adventurous, and the daring. Ben Bella has demonstrated that he has courage. Paramount political power, however, dictates that he now manifest the qualities of a skilled planner, a daring administrator, an imaginative organizer and an inspiring proconsul.

France's presence in the North African littoral began to be felt after the now famous peacock-feather flywhisk incident, in which

the French Consul in Algiers, Pierre Duval, was struck repeatedly by Dey Khodja Husein over a financial issue. It was not until three years after the incident (in June, 1830) and for basically different reasons that France retaliated with the invasion of 35,000 men and 600 ships. Major Algerian resistance was not crushed until 17 years later.

THE FRENCH PRESENCE

During the more than 100 years that followed, France's accomplishments in Algeria were of monumental proportion. The far corners of Algeria were drawn together into one identifiable political entity; tribal ethnocentrism was suppressed; modern roads, schools, and cultural institutions were implanted. In addition, a modern cash economy was introduced, as were new farming techniques, industrial complexes, and more than one million non-indigenous farmers, government officials, businessmen and merchants. These Europeans became the primary residents and beneficiaries of the modern enclaves carved out of traditional Algeria.

Of the Muslim population, few adapted themselves rapidly to the cultural and material domination of the Europeans. Their resistance was deeply rooted in what we might characterize as regional pride and ethnocentrism. As Professor Charles-André Julien has noted, "they kept themselves free from any alien moral imprint."¹

From an historical perspective, the standard of Algerian dissidence which was raised on All Soul's Day in 1954 might be regarded as simply another indigenous uprising against "foreign" domination. The main difference, however, was that by the mid-1950's Algerian opposition had assumed a basically nationalist coloration, rather than being tribal or regional in inspiration as heretofore. Thus, more than 100 years of French *presence* had produced a dramatic metamorphosis in Algeria: this once deeply divided area had been transformed into a coherent political collectivity, one whose indigenous population was

seeking an identity of its own, separate from France.

The underlying causes of the Algerian revolution were numerous, intricately interrelated and exceedingly complex. Certainly, frustration and anger over the manner in which Arabs and Berbers were disqualified from the decision-making process or from political positions commensurate with their number played a significant part, as did: (1) the disproportionate political influence accorded the European minority; (2) the sequestration of private property for European settlers; (3) blatant weighting of elections in favor of pliable Muslim candidates (derisively referred to as "Beni Oui Ouis"; and (4) the severe repression which greeted the efforts of Algerian nationalist leaders urging reforms and a reallocation of political power.

Equally rankling to nationalist sensibilities were the vastly superior economic and social advantages enjoyed by the European minority. Numbering little more than one million out of a total population of 10,196,740 in 1960, for example, the Europeans accounted for an estimated 45 per cent of total personal income from the country as a whole. Other figures are equally instructive: (1) Europeans supplied almost 65 per cent of the industrial labor force, more than 60 per cent of top echelon governmental personnel, and more than 17 per cent in commerce and the "liberal professions"; (2) Europeans reportedly were responsible for employing 90 per cent of the labor force in industry and commerce; (3) they accounted for 92 per cent of gross business earnings; and (4) provided 92 per cent of Algeria's private investment.

The disqualification of the Muslim in the modern sector probably was best reflected in Algeria's educational system. While 870,000 Muslims were matriculating at various levels in 1961—an increase of 380,000 over 1958—only 31,500 were in secondary schools. Of more than 7,000 students enrolled at the University of Algiers, only 1,300 were non-European. (On the other hand, 3,350 were pursuing advanced studies outside of Algeria, many with Algerian nationalist financial support.)

¹ Julien, Charles-André, *L'Afrique du Nord en Marche*. Paris, Julliard, 1952.

THE NATIONALIST REVOLT

The Algerians have been a people of infinite poverty undergoing, as one French sociologist has indicated, a progressively debilitating process of "pauperization." (Economic expansion has not kept pace with the national birth rate of 3 per cent annually; some authorities estimate that Algeria's indigenous population will almost double by 1985.) Certainly, the havoc and devastation produced by the nationalist uprising and French counterstrokes have only multiplied Algerian liabilities. More than 250,000 Algerians fled to Morocco and Tunisia as refugees and now require resettlement. In addition, almost two million *fellaheen* and pastoralists were uprooted; some were placed in regroupment centers, but are now seeking to take up their erstwhile occupational pursuits.

Unfortunately, many farms have been destroyed, wells silted, and implements lost. In addition, probably more than 150,000 men, within the productive 15-60 age group, are dead, maimed or missing. Families have been torn apart and other severe social dislocations have been felt in many sectors of the indigenous society, urban and rural.

While the costs of the Algerian revolution were exceedingly high for most Arabs and Berbers, in many instances their fervor and patriotism were equal to the occasion.

The rebellion itself, as an historical phenomenon, had its inception with the organization of the clandestine *Organisation Spéciale* in 1948-1949 by Ahmed Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed and M. Khider. The subsequent arrest of these leaders led to the broadening of the secret movement into a collegial directorate called the *Comité Révolutionnaire d'unité et d'action*. Consisting of nine chieftains, C.R.U.A. was responsible for setting in motion the forces of rebellion.

It is not necessary here to rehearse all of the various stages through which the Algerian revolutionary movement evolved. The subsequent formation of a national front—the F.L.N.—and the Soumman Valley conference of 1956 all tended to strengthen and to

enhance the élan of the movement. The subsequent creation of a government-in-exile and a provisional administering body added to the durability and international recognition of the movement. Similarly, the impact of the revolution upon France and French politics, commencing with the 1958 uprising which brought General de Gaulle to power, is equally well known.

These seminal events, however, tended to obscure three basic issues which were festering within the F.L.N. and awaited the conclusion of the war to erupt publicly. They revolved around these questions: (1) the nature of the nationalist leadership after independence; (2) the powers to be accorded regional interests; and (3) the type of society which was to emerge from the ashes of war, including the character of the postwar relationship to be established with France.

Not illogically, it was the question of Algerian-French ties which emerged first for resolution. Commencing with President de Gaulle's late 1959 offer of "a peace of the brave," the F.L.N. leadership was compelled to think through its position on the type of peace it desired. Apparently, some disagreement crystallized, for it was not until two years later (and at least one P.G.A.R. cabinet reshuffle had transpired), that the nationalists established sufficient consensus to enter into the final stages of negotiation leading to the Evian Accords. (One must recall that, on the French side, the 1960 revolt of the "cobblestones" and the 1961 "insurrection" of the generals also tended to impede earlier conclusion of the "pourparlers.")

The Evian Accords themselves represent a formidable edifice of general accommodation on both sides. For its part, France was committed to grant Algeria total independence once the wish was stipulated in a national referendum; France also assured Algeria its financial support after the referendum, promised aid in the training of Algerian technicians, and offered to negotiate a continuation of the special preferential tariff, marketing, and other commercial arrangements which were of direct benefit to the Algerian economy. In addition, France promised to accord

Algerian nationals residing in France, particularly workers, the same privileges as French nationals (with the exception of political rights).

The F.L.N., for its part, entered into an imposing array of engagements. *Inter alia*, the F.L.N. obligated itself to respect the civil rights of French nationals residing in Algeria, to avoid taking extra-legal action against these nationals, and to offer adequate compensation for any sequestration of property.

In the economic realm, Algeria is to be a member of the franc area, but will retain its own monetary unity, one which will enjoy free transferability. Algeria also is to guarantee French economic interests and the vested rights of individuals and legal entities. In the Sahara, further development and exploitation of resources is to be undertaken on a basis of mutual benefit to France and Algeria.

Finally, in the area of military and defense matters, France is committed to the reduction of its armed forces to an 80,000 man level within 12 months after self-determination is realized. On the other hand, Algeria has guaranteed to lease the use of the Mers-el-Kebir naval installation to France for a 15-year period. In addition, certain specified air bases and ancillary facilities are to be placed at the disposal of France for a five year period. These installations, however, "under no circumstances," are to be utilized for aggressive military purposes.

THE TROUBLED TRANSITION

The Evian Accords also clearly defined those steps and procedures to be pursued preparatory to the "recourse to the urns" of national referendum. Public powers were to be lodged: (1) on the part of France, in a High Commissioner; and (2) in behalf of all Algerians, French and Muslim, in a Provisional Executive. The latter body was to:

—assure the conduct of Algeria's public affairs, including the country's direct administration;

—maintain public law and order by organizing necessary police and security forces;

—prepare and implement plans for self-determination.

The F.L.N., during the transitional period, was to function as a legal political body, assure that its troops maintained their previous positions, and insure that the guarantees accorded Europeans were respected.

Unfortunately, the Evian Accords, rather than restoring tranquility, served to unleash all of the virulently divisive forces that were latent within both the European community and the nationalist movement.

Extremists among the Europeans, together with dissident French Army officers, immediately launched a frenetic, last-ditch effort to block implementation of the agreements. In sheer fanaticism, wantonness and savagery these terrorist attacks by "civilized" Europeans were unsurpassed anywhere since World War II. Defenseless Muslim women and children were cut down, unarmed men assassinated, and a gulf of fear and hate formed between the two communities.

However, Muslim discipline held and the threatened crisis was averted. Indeed, the consequences of the wave of terror initiated by the European Secret Army Organization followed a path unforeseen by its directors: the French government became, if anything, even more determined to move Algeria toward self-determination. Moreover, the French Army, itself deeply distressed by the O.A.S. terror, frequently acted sternly against O.A.S. leaders, and shored-up France's legal authority during an extremely dangerous time.

Nevertheless, not all the consequences of the O.A.S. period were so reassuring. Terrorist violence simply gave added impetus to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Europeans to the Metropole, thus virtually paralyzing the modern sector of the Algerian economy. In addition, O.A.S. sympathizers within the government fostered their own form of havoc before departing: tax records and other documentation were destroyed, essential files carried off, and necessary equipment misplaced. Thus, not only were the services of many qualified Europeans lost to the incoming Algerian regime, but also all sense of continuity, all hope of a logical progression, all expectation of a tranquil transfer of power. Indeed, the Provisional Executive

set up under the Evian provisions—heeded by F.L.N. personnel—found itself rusticated at Rocher Noire, 30 miles from Algiers, out of fear of O.A.S. reprisals.

Also frustrated by the O.A.S. terror were plans to form an indigenous security force—a *Force Locale*—of 35,000 men to assure law and order during the transitional period from March until mid-1962.

The Evian Accords and the subsequent O.A.S. depredations also brought to the surface the second basic issue to divide the F.L.N., i.e., the nature of the nationalist leadership after independence. Almost from its inception, the F.L.N. had been rent by dissension over the question of collegial vs. individual responsibility. The 1956 Soumman conference had opted for the former. However, Ahmed Ben Bella and his supporters subsequently denounced this decision. By June, 1962, the question was reopened at the Tripoli (Libya) Congress of the F.L.N. At a critical moment of the meetings, P.G.A.R. chieftain Ben Khedda and his supporters summarily quit the conference and returned to Tunis. At the end of June, Ben Khedda "fired" Chief-of-Staff Colonel Houari Boumedienne and two aides for "plotting" against the legitimate authority of the F.L.N.

The battle lines were quickly drawn a few days later when Ben Bella, Khider, and Boumedienne arrayed themselves against Ben Khedda, Belkacem Krim, and Mohammed Boudiaf. In the days which followed, Colonel Boumedienne's "external army" of 30,000-40,000 men—forced to sit out the war by

² The Algerian referendum took place in an atmosphere of extreme gravity on July 1, 1962, with an overwhelming majority voting to favor independence. On July 3, 1962, Algeria was proclaimed an independent and sovereign state.

³ *Willaya* is the formal F.L.N. designation for the six operational command zones established in Algeria for guerrilla warfare. Each *willaya*, while theoretically responsible to the F.L.N., operated almost autonomously because of wartime exigencies.

⁴ Of 6,304,033 inscribed on the voting rolls, 84 per cent, or 5,303,661 reportedly participated in the election. Of these, approximately 95 per cent supported the electoral list. Only 25,000 were reported to have voted negatively. The greatest number of abstentions occurred in the Departments of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. These probably reflected the general exodus of Europeans from Algeria.

French electrified barricades—crossed the frontiers from Morocco and Tunisia and threatened a march on Algiers.² On August 2, 1962, Ben Khedda capitulated and Ben Bella entered Algiers as the head of a six man Political Bureau established to govern Algeria until a Constituent Assembly was elected. For the moment, it appeared that the issue of national leadership had been resolved at last.

However, it was precisely at this juncture that the F.L.N. became seized with its third, and perhaps most crucial, issue, i.e., government centrisim vs. regionalism. At the heart of this question were a unique blend of historically-rooted ethnocentricities, personality clashes and narrow self-interest engendered by the struggle for liberation. In its public form, however, the challenge to the central authority was characterized as "willayaism," i.e., the desire of certain willaya³ chiefs, particularly in the Kabylie Berber region and the area around Algiers, to maintain virtually unrestrained control over their zones.

Mounting insecurity as a result of the looting and depredations of willaya forces in the Algiers region, the semi-autonomous status sought by their commanders and the resultant threat that this constituted to central authority, constrained Ben Bella once again to call upon the Boumedienne forces to march upon Algiers. In August-September, Algeria balanced precariously on the precipice of civil war. Only the threat of ultimate chaos and the anguished outcry among the Algerian masses—some of whom interposed themselves between the contending armies—averted sustained conflict. A *modus vivendi* was finally worked out among the various forces on September 5, and Algeria once again returned to its first concern, the implantation of representative governing institutions and the initiation of efforts to revive the national economy.

Finally, after several postponements, the nation voted on a one-party list of candidates to fill the 196 member Constituent Assembly. Prepared by Ben Bella's Political Bureau, the election made no provision for competitive campaigning for Assembly seats and, in essence, was regarded as a request for a national vote of confidence in the Political Bureau.⁴

Soon after convening, the Assembly invested Ben Bella with the powers of Prime Minister and approved his cabinet (including Rabah Bitat, Boumedienne, Ahmed, Francis, Mohammed Khemisti, Ahmed Tewfik El Mandani, and Amar Ouzegane) by a vote of 159 to 1, with 19 abstentions. Algeria's troubled transition to independence was finally at an end; now the struggle for survival officially commenced.

SURVIVAL: THE LOOMING CHALLENGES

(1) *Economic.* The dislocations suffered by the Algerian economy—both modern and traditional—have been far-reaching. With the disappearance of many hundreds of thousands of Europeans, numerous vital industrial and commercial establishments are at a virtual standstill, important economic services have been paralyzed, and gross trade imbalances have resulted. At present, more than 70 per cent of the labor force is unemployed. Over 2.5 million Algerians are dependent upon foreign charitable donors—of which the U.S. has been the leader—for sustenance.

Algeria remains heavily dependent upon France, in particular, for economic and financial assistance to meet its operating governmental deficits, to cover a major trade deficit, and to help create a stable fiscal system and economic development program. The magnitude of Algeria's difficulties is reflected in the fact that no taxes have been collected since March, 1962, and that the European, who in the past carried a heavy proportion of the tax burden, is a rapidly dwindling financial factor for future planning.

The French government has extended emergency financial aid with grants in the magnitude of \$400 million. These grants were sufficient to run the government until December 31, 1962. Added budgetary transfusions probably will not be vouchsafed until a host of new agreements are concluded, as provided for under the terms of the Evian Accords. In the interim, the Algerian government is expected to be confronted with the need for securing 4 billion francs (\$800 million) during 1963. Only part of its needs

probably will be met by revenues from oil and natural gas exploitation in the Sahara.

(2) *Governmental.* At present, Ben Bella has only the skeletal configuration of a governmental apparatus. At the ministerial level, programming is on an *ad hoc* basis due to the dearth of technicians, advisers, and administrative personnel.

At the local level, the Ben Bella regime has yet to implant its full authority in a number of locales. It still is seeking to form the cadres of trained and loyal personnel necessary for the formation of a coherent pattern of local, regional and national administration.

(3) *Conversion of the Military and Internal Security.* While a substantial measure of order and security has been restored to Algiers and its environs, the government continues to be faced with unruly and irresponsible acts by elements which refuse to recognize its fiat. Indeed, since July 1, large numbers of irregular forces, including bands of unemployed, have been roaming several regions. Trading upon their "patriotic" efforts during the struggle for freedom, some of them have engaged in exactions from the civilian populace.

Plans are now being formulated for returning these "irregulars" to civilian life and, through the creation of an effective constabulary, for enforcing order in rural areas. This process of "reconversion," however, is likely to be lengthy and extremely arduous, for the task is indeed Herculean.

In fact, most of the problems enumerated above impinge upon one another. Thus, internal security requires demobilization. Demobilization, however, is bound to be slow since men currently under arms are fearful that, once returned to civilian life, they will simply swell the ranks of the unemployed. Economic recovery and fuller employment, on the other hand, are dependent upon a return of Europeans to Algeria—which, in turn, has as a precondition a restoration of confidence through a return of order and internal security. To complete this melancholy cycle, order and security probably will require the services of large numbers of military and police forces—a financial luxury which Algeria can ill-afford.

THE DESIGN OF THE BEN BELLA REGIME

There can be little doubt that independence has carried with it numerous confusions. While the country's various forces have been sorting themselves out, many deeper issues have not been confronted: e.g., the nature of the society which will evolve, its elan and organization and so forth. For the immediate future, there still remain the consolidation of political power, the subordination of the military, and the fashioning of a coherent policy and accompanying machinery to initiate a program of nation building.

At the moment, rudimentary policy and goal outlines have been formulated. They are predicated upon a common experience—a national revolution, unprecedented in its magnitude and ferocity, which has been successfully pursued. Thus, dynamism and aggressiveness are to be the hallmarks of the government. Its foreign policy will be neutralist, non-aligned, *non-engagé*. Algeria under Ben Bella will seek to maintain its revolutionary fervor by aiding liberation movements in southern Africa, by consolidating its ties with the Middle Eastern states of like orientation and, perhaps, by examining more closely the Cuban brand of social revolution.

On the other hand, sheer necessity commands prudence in maintaining ties with the West. France alone has the experience, knowledge and will to carry Algeria through the difficult days ahead. Prime Minister Ben Bella has clearly stated that he intends to honor the Evian Accords. Nevertheless, some reservations on Saharan nuclear testing and the leasing of military installments to France are clearly in prospect.

On the domestic front, the Premier has indicated that he hopes to transform the F.L.N. into a *parti unique*. If successful, the F.L.N. will serve as a prime instrumentality for mobilizing the bulk of Algerians behind present leadership in efforts to rehabilitate the economy and to reconstruct the society.

In terms of domestic policy, the government undoubtedly is inspired by the slogan: "Pour les grands problèmes, grands moyens." Undoubtedly, the magnitude of the problems

confronting it, the odds working against early success, and instincts developed during seven years of conflict, all urge radical "solutions." But radicalism, which is essentially a style of governance, carries with it inherent complications and frustrations of its own.

Thus, far-reaching land reform involving nationalization and sequestration of European properties would result in a net decline in agricultural productivity in a nation where agriculture claims the energies of 80 per cent of the population. Moreover, French subventions would diminish as a result of France's obligation to reimburse French property holders. In the end, it would appear that prudence promises to yield greater benefits than radical, dramatized "solutions."

There can be little doubt that Algeria will bulk large in Middle Eastern and African affairs for many years to come. Its unprecedented revolution serves as an inspiration for nationalists, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Algeria's dynamism also will attract many followers, as will the courage and verve of its leadership.

What, however, is the image we may anticipate over the next few years?

Will Algeria be Marxist in orientation? Socialist in philosophy? Arab in its essential interests? Traditional in its approach to the proper order of human relationships?

Prophecy is at best an exceedingly risky undertaking. I would suggest that Algeria will be *sui generis*—at times refractory; in some instances, placid; but always exciting. Algeria will be radical upon occasion, moderate upon other occasions. Neither completely Marxist nor completely traditionally Muslim, Algeria will defy classification, confound its judges, and yet play a role in the world disproportionate to its size and population.

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Discussing domestic and foreign policies in Morocco, this author declares that "Morocco's alleged shift to the East . . . is more verbal than real, and the left-wing as well as the right-wing appear determined to keep Morocco truly 'non-aligned.'"

Morocco Faces the Future

By LORNA HAHN

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MOROCCO BECAME independent on March 2, 1956,* after two and a half years of bitter fighting by Arab and Berber, *bourgeois* and tribesman. Unlike most nations for whom armed revolt was the price of liberty, however, Morocco has not gone on to effect a political, social and economic revolution. Instead, it is ruled by a monarch and a cabinet of assorted conservatives who favor few fundamental changes in the *status quo* at home, while advocating "radical nationalist" policies abroad.

Although internal progress has hardly fulfilled the earlier hopes and promises of the nationalists, however, few of Morocco's 12 million people appear ripe for revolt. And although foreign policy has bitterly flayed "colonialism" and praised African "liberation," the Moroccan government, at the moment, has better relations with the "colonialist" powers than with the neighboring African states.

To understand this bundle of apparent paradoxes, one must bear in mind the conditions prevailing at the time Morocco cast off her French and Spanish protectors. For one thing, Moroccan leaders faced more than the usual problems of a high birth rate, wide-

spread poverty and underdeveloped resources: they also had to contend with the reluctance of several areas, such as the Rif, to obey central authority, with a critical shortage of trained administrative personnel, and with the insecurity and bitterness of the remaining French settlers and civil servants.

There were also the special problems of settling the status of the American bases, the international city of Tangiers, and of integrating the former French and Spanish zones. Such matters as troop withdrawal, trade and aid had to be arranged with both France and Spain, while the latter's retention of five *presidios* in the north and a sizeable chunk of the Sahara posed an added irritant. Aggravating all these problems was the Algerian war, which sorely strained Moroccan-French relations, and forced the government to take an increasingly strident position against "colonialism" in all forms.

A skillful resolution of these problems—to which was added a series of natural disasters—would have required a government of angels and not of men in Rabat (and, preferably, in Paris, Madrid, and a few other capitals). But Morocco's leaders lacked not only harps and halos: they also lacked a basic unity of purpose and program. The shrewdest politician of them all—and the only man able to command some sort of allegiance from all elements in the country—was not a mass leader, but his Majesty Mohammed V, whose deposition in 1953 had united the entire coun-

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mark I. Cohen for some of the research material on which this article is based. Mark Cohen, a New York lawyer who spent several years in Morocco, is the co-author with Lorna Hahn of the book, *Contemporary Morocco*, to be published by the Frederick A. Praeger Company.

try against the French. A dedicated ruler who was doubtless sincere in his professed desire to become a true constitutional monarch, he was nonetheless loathe to share his undivided powers with one strong party, and to put the franchise in the hands of irresponsible, untrained individuals.

The dominant *Istiqlal* (Independence) party, although demanding "democracy" under its own one-party rule, was unable for several reasons to force from its sovereign either full control of the government or a constitution.¹ For one thing, it lacked grass-roots support in many areas, notably the *bled*, which tended to distrust city politicians.

Far more important was the fact that its leadership was fractured along complex personal and ideological lines. Thus its president, Allal al Fassi, advocated such concepts as revolution within an Islamic context (although his daughters remained veiled and he favored limited suffrage), strong ties with the Arab states, firmness towards colonialism and the extension of Morocco's undefined southern frontier to "St. Louis de Senegal." Included with him in the "conservative" wing was Secretary General Ahmed Balafrej, to whom violent change was repugnant, French culture as appealing as Arabic, and foreign affairs a matter of quiet negotiation.

Opposed to this old guard were Assistant Secretary General Mehdi ben Barka, former leader of the urban resistance, and labor chief Mahjoub ben Seddik, who urged an end to "feudalism" and the start of democracy. Largely because of the tri-cornered battle between the two factions of *Istiqlal*, and between both and the palace, the march towards democracy has been exceedingly slow. The

internal political strife has also prevented a concerted, sustained program of economic and social reform, and made foreign policy largely a means of diverting public discontent from domestic matters.

THE MONARCHY

Despite such gestures as retitling himself "King" rather than Sultan, and changing his country's official name from "Cherifian Empire" to "Kingdom of Morocco," Mohammed V did little to develop the true constitutional monarchy to which he and even the most conservative politicians paid lip service. Thus the Consultative Assembly, created in 1957 in order to provide Moroccans with wider experience in public affairs, could do no more than advise the King and question officials on such matters as the budget. And although its 76 members were drawn from all walks of life, including agriculture and labor, they were drawn by His Majesty himself, not popularly elected. The Royal Charter issued the following year, which promised such advances as popular elections and a Deliberative Assembly that would share the royal legislative power, was followed by the creation in 1959 of a parliamentary body no more responsive to popular will than its predecessor, and by no elections of any sort.

Discontent with such measures, coupled with criticism of the cautious policies of Premier Balafrej, finally brought to a head the growing dissension within the ranks of *Istiqlal*. On January 25, 1959, Mehdi ben Barka, then president of the Consultative Assembly, condemned party leadership for "three years of weakness, negligence and grave errors," and proceeded to establish his own party organization. The following September, seconded by ben Seddik and former Vice Premier and Minister of Economy Abderahim Bouabid, and supported by much of the youth as well as the have-nots of all strata, the dissidents baptized themselves the National Union of Popular Forces (U.N.F.P.).²

Largely because of U.N.F.P. pressures, nation-wide elections were held for the first time on May 29, 1960, to select 10,000 members of municipal and communal assemblies.

¹ Although holding a predominant role continually, *Istiqlal* did not even head the government officially until May 8, 1958, when Balafrej was named premier. For further details, see Benjamin Rivlin, "Towards Political Maturity in Morocco," *Current History*, July, 1959. For a thorough account of post-independent changes, see Douglas Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco* (Princeton, 1961). See also Lorna Hahn, *North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood* (Public Affairs Press, 1960).

² Although U.N.F.P. leaders speak of "revolution" in general and denounce the monarchy as presently constituted, however, they do not openly advocate overthrow of the king.

Under universal suffrage (under which 1.6 million of 4.2 million registered voters were women), 70 per cent of those eligible cast ballots in 11,000 polling booths. Since candidates ran as individuals rather than as members of parties—an arrangement which did nothing to further the concept of party responsibility—both sides were able to make exaggerated claims as to their strength.

Popular satisfaction with this democratic exercise was somewhat muted, however, by the fact that Premier Abdullah Ibrahim, an open advocate of a popularly elected parliament and constitution, had been ousted nine days before.³ Claiming that the bickering or ineptness of politicians was responsible for much of the current national unrest, the King thereby assumed the premiership himself, making Crown Prince Moulay Hassan Deputy Premier. At the same time, however, the monarch promised his people a constitution by the end of 1962, and in November, 1960, created a 78-member Constitutional Council. He was not, however, to preside over its deliberations: in February, 1961, while undergoing minor nasal surgery, Mohammed V's heart stopped beating. After a series of security measures designed to preclude any possible attempts at revolution, the Prince announced the death of his father and his own assumption of the throne as Hassan II.

The 33-year old monarch, helped by his record of governmental experience but handicapped by a reputation for personal indiscretions, made clear his political intentions in March by stating that economic improvement must come first, political democracy later. Even the Fundamental Law which he promulgated in June, declaring that Morocco is an Arab, Muslim kingdom moving towards democracy and proclaiming the rights of individuals, offered no real guarantees for these rights and no dates for parliamentary elections. In mid-1961, in response to popular

³ A leader of the "progressive" wing of the Istiqlal, Ibrahim had been given the post on December 16, 1958, following a severe government crisis. He was given the premiership, however, not as a representative of Istiqlal, but in "his personal capacity," with his prime task being to prepare for the coming elections. He subsequently joined U.N.F.P.

pressures, he ostensibly made Interior and Agriculture Minister Reda Guedira a stronger figure by naming him head of the Royal Cabinet, but he retained the premiership.

While such behavior may seem folly, there are several reasons why the young king may retain his throne for some time. One is the fact that he is supported not only by "feudal" and conservative business interests, but also by the majority of civil servants, the police and the senior army officers, i.e., those who control the actual instruments of state power. Far more significant, however, is the *immobilisme* of the U.N.F.P., which has more slogans than plans, which still lacks real strength in the *bled*, and whose leaders have shown little real political acumen or courage.

Lack of inspiring leadership, along with various petty intrigues, have tended to make many ordinary people disgusted with politicians, more apathetic than enthusiastic to revolutionary appeals of any sort, and more open to royal blandishments, which Hassan has provided through numerous public appearances. Finally, thanks largely to the Algerian cease-fire, he may be able to bring the country noticeable material benefits—although, of course, the greatest single threat to his position also comes from Algeria.

REFORMS

Economic and social measures, in many instances, have thus far been inadequate not so much because they were poorly planned or executed, but simply because of the enormity of the problem they were designed to combat. In absolute terms, for example, great improvements have been made in the field of education. Thus in 1956, the government initiated a program which built an alleged seven and a half classrooms per day—(as compared with the one per day constructed during 1943–1953). In addition, it started several crash programs to teach adults and children unable to attend school the fundamentals of reading and writing. With the population increasing at a rate of about 2 per cent a year, however, and half the population under 20 years of age, facilities are barely keeping

pace with the growing number of school-age children, let alone drastically improving what was a 97 per cent rate of illiteracy in 1955.

Many more complex problems, however, might have been better handled had the government been more favorable to state planning—if not quite to the “socialism” advocated by the opposition. Thus the fact that a million city dwellers remain housed in slums or overcrowded medinas may be due to serious flaws in the current five-year plan (under which the private sector builds 10,000 dwellings per year, the state only 4,500), as well as to the rural exodus and the shortage of capital and construction materials. Furthermore, the trek to the cities, which has been augmenting the urban population by five per cent a year, might have been slowed down somewhat if agricultural reform had progressed.

Despite the sporadic success of such projects as “Operation Plow,” under which government agricultural experts and equipment have rendered viable many thousands of acres of land, many of Morocco’s farmers—who comprise over 70 per cent of the population—still live in abject or even “feudal” conditions. To have undertaken a comprehensive program of land reclamation and redistribution, however—as well as to industrialize and provide jobs for the over half million *chômeurs*—would have required more than the large amount of planning and nationalization advocated by U.N.F.P.: it would also have required massive foreign aid. And here domestic politics become enmeshed with foreign politics.

France previously linked her economic assistance to such matters as protection of *colons*, maintenance of troops (ostensibly to protect French lives and property) and neutrality, at least, in the Algerian war. Repeated clashes on these questions resulted not only in stoppages of French aid, but in a growing Moroccan resentment of “neo-colonialism.” This

feeling was further augmented by Spanish reluctance to discuss withdrawal of troops and relinquishing of territory, by the United States tacit support of France in Algeria and her reluctance to “replace” French aid,⁴ and by the presence of the American air bases, which had been leased from (and were still partially administered by) France.

Partly out of general frustration and partly out of the desire to divert domestic discontent and detract from the appeal of the leftists, Morocco’s conservative incumbents (led by Hassan) turned from their original pro-Western neutrality to a strident anti-colonial revisionist policy with pro-Eastern overtones. Morocco has thus tried (both diplomatically and militarily) to “recover” the Spanish Sahara and the independent state of Mauritania—which she claims mainly by virtue of sixteenth century conquest. She has supported Patrice Lumumba and denounced Habib Bourguiba, become a Charter member in 1960 of the Casablanca group, and made several agreements for trade and technical assistance with the Eastern bloc. Yet the Western nations have done far more to help King Hassan than have his newer partners, and they will probably continue to do so.

Most significant is the new *rapprochement* with France. Although repeated Moroccan pressures had already brought the phased withdrawal of most French troops, the tapering off of the Algerian war permitted President de Gaulle to announce on September 1, 1960, the complete evacuation of all Moroccan military installations by the following March.

A visit to Paris by Hassan in May, 1962, coupled with hints of a willingness to compromise on Mauritania by considering some loose association with it, led to a resumption of the ties that Rabat had disrupted following French atomic tests in the Sahara. In July, the announcement was formally made not only of an extensive trade agreement, but also of an aid program totalling \$70 million.⁵ In addition, Paris promised to triple its current technical assistance program by providing approximately \$240 million and facilitating the

⁴ Although small at first, however, American aid has not been negligible in recent years.

⁵ Morocco in 1961 had a \$60 million deficit in her balance of payments with France, due mainly to a halt in investments, a \$30 million expenditure on military matters, and a drought affecting grain exports.

recruitment of needed technicians and teachers.⁶

Relations with Spain are not quite so cordial: an "economic war" has been waged against the presidios, and clashes still occur in the Sahara. Nevertheless, Madrid is now withdrawing the last of its troops, thus giving Hassan another feather in his fez, while the King has several times voiced his desire for Moroccan-Spanish amity.

Washington has also indicated a desire to increase its aid considerably, perhaps in partial exchange for a new lease on one of the bases which President Eisenhower promised we would evacuate by 1963.

Communist economic assistance or investments have actually been small, despite the publicity. Trading with the Communist Bloc totals only six per cent of Morocco's total—with deliveries often falling short of promises—and the small amounts of Soviet military aid, while useful as a token of defying the West, have been of little value otherwise. Ben Seddik, in fact, started the meeting of the Communist-sponsored International Students Union held in Casablanca in March, 1961, by denouncing the recently-delivered MIG's as a useless burden to the economy. Morocco's alleged shift to the East, in other words, is more verbal than real, and the left-wing as well as the right-wing appear determined to keep Morocco truly "non-aligned."

While neither "neo-colonialism" nor communism poses a serious problem at the moment, however, many of the people who ostensibly should be Morocco's allies are problems. The Casablanca group, for example, shows every sign of disintegrating: Ghana, despite pledges to the contrary, has recognized Mauritania; Guinea and Mali show increasing interest in the Monrovia group; Egyptian teachers are not renewing contracts in Morocco because they claim they were not properly appreciated there.

Despite continued talk of Maghrebian unity—which could greatly benefit Moroccan economic development—relations with Tunisia are strained because of Tunisia's recognition

of Mauritania, Morocco's resentment of Tunisian internal progress, and Morocco's tacit encouragement of Bourguiba's opponents. Most serious, however, are relations with Algeria.

Despite Morocco's assistance in arranging the cease-fire, relations are far from harmonious between the "Democratic Peoples' Republic" of Ben Bella and the "People's Monarchy" of Hassan. One source of discord is the undefined Sahara boundary. Morocco shelved the Saharan claims it had made on France in order to permit Paris to grant the entire desert to the F.L.N. and thus facilitate the cease-fire. Adjustments were then to be made with the government of independent Algeria. The latter, however, has shown little interest in yielding any territory, and several clashes have occurred between Moroccan and Algerian troops in Tindouf and nearby areas. But the greatest problem, of course, is the omnipresent possibility that the dedicated revolutionaries behind Ben Bella—notably Minister of Defense Houari Boumedienne—might seek to revolutionize Morocco. The attempt could be made, perhaps, through a coup by young army officers, an arrangement with opposition leaders, a Rifian revolt, or some combination of these tactics.

Given unsettled conditions in so many aspects of Moroccan life, in sum, almost anything could happen in the near future: revolution, reform, or simply a continuation in some form of the often contradictory policies which have often helped politicians at a given moment, but have done little for the people. What Morocco needs above all else is some moderation and statesmanship on the part of its leaders of all factions. This is something that outsiders may wish to encourage, but which only Morocco itself can produce.

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⁶ Approximately 8,000 French teachers are now in Morocco; 1,000 more have been promised.

Discussing Tunisia's position in North Africa and relations with the newly independent Algeria, this author writes that President Bourguiba ". . . remains ideologically 'out of step' with his North African neighbors . . . with regard to the various Pan-African movements." "Bourguiba seems to favor a modest, functional approach to Maghreb unity rather than hasty and spectacular political promises that lead nowhere."

"Bourguibism" in Tunisia

By CLEMENT HENRY MOORE

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DURING ITS first four years of independence (1956-1960), Tunisia seemed the model *pays pilote* that might provide political leadership for North Africa and a democratic pattern of development for other emerging nations. Political cohesion and stability gave the country international prestige and influence incommensurate with its modest size (slightly greater than New York State), population (less than four million), and economic resources. Tunisia's nationalist anti-colonialist credentials were more authentic than those of most Afro-Asian countries, for Tunisia had developed the best organized mass party in the Arab world to win its independence virtually unaided against overwhelming odds during 20 years of long struggle.

Over the past year Tunisia seems successfully to have survived the Bizerte crisis and to have set itself to the task of economic development. It will be argued here that the crisis of 1961 was not merely one of Franco-Tunisian relations. Rather, the Bizerte affair was a symptom of a more far-reaching malaise that affected Tunisia both at home and in its relations with its neighbors. Surviving the shock of Bizerte involved a fundamental readjustment as Tunisia moved away from the honeymoon of national independence and high expectations toward a more mature

domestic understanding and more modest, specific goals.

Upon achieving power, the leaders and militants of the Neo-Destour party proved to be capable and responsible rulers, diplomats and administrators. Led by their "Supreme Combattant," Habib Bourguiba, the new government artfully pursued the tasks of decolonization by protracted political negotiations with France. At the same time, it mobilized popular support for daring social and religious reforms needed to modernize the country. When Bourguiba's support of the Algerian Revolution led France in 1957 to cut all economic aid, his pro-Western orientation gained him strong American support. Bourguiba seemed to be proving to his "brothers" of the Maghreb that close cooperation with the West was the most effective means of assuring genuine independence and development.

Linked to Tunisia's inordinate prestige in Western and United Nations circles was the exceptional personality of President Bourguiba. A hero to his people, they considered him "too big" for his little country; the exceptional statesman—whose leadership and exhortations had made Tunisians aware of their human dignity and their national identity—was thought to have a larger North African audience to win over to his ideas.

Might not "Bourguibism," as French journalists named Bourguiba's revolutionary tactics, apply also to Algeria? Based on his democratic and modernizing outlook, Bourguibism had effectively guided the process of Tunisian emancipation and given its author, at least inside Tunisia, a reputation for political infallibility.

Rather than a frontal assault on the colonial situation, Bourguibism had involved persuading the "adversary" that reforms leading to independence were in his best interest. Methods of persuasion rather than force were always to be preferred, because changes of individual attitudes were considered to lie at the root of all social transformations. Thus Bourguiba was always ready to compromise and negotiate in stages with French governments, so long as a given compromise did not preclude subsequent advance toward the objective of independence and cooperation, freely consented, with France. Similarly, the task of internal Tunisian development required gradual changes of individual attitudes through education, party propaganda, and Bourguiba's persuasive oratory—democratic methods, in short, that accorded with the man's commitment to individual liberty in a modern open society.

When on July 19, 1961, the Tunisians opened fire on the French forces at Bizerte, it appeared that Bourguiba had forsaken his classic methods of negotiation for the indiscriminate use of force. But Bourguibism had never ruled out the limited use of force to persuade the adversary to negotiate concessions. Though subordinating violence to politics, the Neo-Destour before independence had adapted its apparatus not only to mass education but to mass agitation, sabotage, and terrorism. During the Bizerte crisis Bourguiba was only using pin-prick tactics that in the past had led to successful negotiations. He unfortunately miscalculated de Gaulle's strength of purpose and the fury of unleashed French *paras*. In the four days of fighting at

least 1,370 Tunisians lost their lives, including women, children, and poorly trained Neo-Destour youths imported from other parts of the country to man the barricades around the French bases.

POST-INDEPENDENCE DECLINE

There were signs even before the crisis, however, that Bourguibism as a recipe for decolonization and modernization was falling out of fashion both in Tunisia and abroad. After the post-independence honeymoon, Tunisia was facing the transition toward a more routine existence and popular enthusiasm was waning. The early days of spectacular reforms, progress just around the corner, crises with France and Tunisification of the administration had given way to less exciting prospects of economic planning, on which Tunisians anyway were divided.

In early February, 1961, at a Neo-Destour meeting Bourguiba for the first time publicly noted the obvious signs of decadence in his ruling party's once imposing machinery. Though this central instrument of the regime in theory represented the popular will, it had neither foreseen nor been able to stop the anti-government Kairouan riots of January 17, 1961.

Even though the relatively traditionalist Kairouan masses, possibly goaded to revolt by the city's anti-Bourguibist old aristocracy,¹ did not represent the national mood, their agitation destroyed the regime's myth of popular cohesion and harmony. The incident also highlighted Bourguiba's significant loss of popularity since his February, 1960, attack on the sacred custom of fasting during the month of Ramadan. Bourguiba's persuasive tactics were not working. The legitimacy of the charismatic leader was in question; many of Tunisia's pious Muslims considered him an atheist.

Bourguiba's economic policies, too, were arousing the apprehension of Tunisian businessmen. In 1956, much to their satisfaction, he had neutralized Ahmed Ben Salah, who was then calling for the nationalization of many key industries and a policy of rigid socialist planning, by having him removed

¹ In his speech of February 8, 1961, Bourguiba plausibly suggested this interpretation. The Governor had vigorously carried out a land reform (private *habous*) that had hurt the old families who manipulated the religious symbols of the society.

from his powerful position as head of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (U.G.T.T.). In January, 1961, however, Bourguiba placed Ben Salah in charge of planning and finances. Though Bourguiba's shift to a policy of economic planning was assured of Neo-Destour support, many people inside as well as outside the party were wary of Ben Salah's rise to power.

Abroad, Bourguiba's prestige was shrinking to dimensions more in keeping with Tunisia's size. Despite a longstanding quarrel with the United Arab Republic, Tunisia had managed until 1960 to enjoy cordial relations with its North African "brothers" while maintaining viable relations with France. As the Algerian conflict wore on, however, it seemed that the methods of negotiation and compromise symbolized by Bourguibism were irrelevant to the situation. After the failure of the Melun talks in June, 1960, the Algerians threatened to add a new dimension to the war—Communist "technicians" and heavy arms transported through Tunisian territory. Though Bourguiba wanted at all costs to avoid bringing the Cold War to North Africa, he felt obliged on October 7, publicly to promise transit rights if the need arose. However, he made one final effort after the December nationalist demonstrations in Algiers to stimulate renewed negotiations between the French and the Algerians.

TUNISIAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS

Bourguiba's talk at Rambouillet with de Gaulle in late February, 1961, failed to effect any significant rapprochement; three months later the first Evian talks broke down over the issue of sovereignty in the Sahara. Bour-

² On June 30, the Tunisian National Guard stopped the French from extending the barbed wire enclosure surrounding the airbase. The French were lengthening their runway for more modern aircraft. On July 1, the French *chargé d'affaires* conferred with two of Bourguiba's top ministers about the incident. According to Bourguiba (speech of August 18), the Tunisians were given 48 hours to consent to extending the barbed wire enclosure. In the face of the ultimatum, Bizerte became a "matter of conscience" for Bourguiba, and de Gaulle refused to negotiate under the pressure of organized Tunisian demonstrations during the following days.

guiba's relations with the Algerians deteriorated because, having his own claims to part of the Sahara, he did not wholeheartedly support the Algerian position. His relations with Morocco were even worse since Tunisia had backed Mauritania's application to the United Nations despite Morocco's irredentist claim to the sparsely populated, mineral rich country. Bourguiba was thus vulnerable to both Algerian and Moroccan charges of collaboration with the forces of "neo-colonialism." To avoid increasing isolation, Tunisia rejoined the Arab League in February, began to patch up its dispute with the U.A.R. and showed a sudden interest in "liberating" Palestine.

Whatever the actual rights and wrongs of the Bizerte dispute,² Bourguiba in the face of growing diplomatic isolation, seemed to be trying to prove that he, too, was an authentic nationalist and not "de Gaulle's crutch." His intransigent demands for the evacuation of the French bases did indeed procure him messages of solidarity from many Afro-Asian countries, including the U.A.R., as well as an offer of military support from the 30,000-man Algerian Liberation Army stationed in Tunisia. His simultaneous demand for a revision of the Saharan frontier met, however, with a less enthusiastic response.

In Tunisia, the pro-Western climate of opinion that Bourguiba had established seemed to disintegrate in the absence of clear-cut Western support for the Tunisian position. The United States, visited by Bourguiba in June, 1961, had been led to believe that he would continue to tolerate the French bases while de Gaulle arranged peace in Algeria. Allied unity in the face of the summer Berlin crisis obviously transcended any interest in supporting Bourguiba's sudden shift of policy.

Some of the Tunisian élite privately criticized Bourguiba's rash actions, and others were concerned about the poor training and preparation received by the Neo-Destour youth who were dying on the barricades. But the party effectively came to Bourguiba's rescue and organized mammoth demonstrations, constant martial music over the radio and loudspeakers, and daily meetings all over the

country during the weeks of tension when renewed hostilities seemed possible.

The "Tunisification" Law of August 30, though only selectively applied, in theory threatened most French businesses (except banking, petroleum, mining and manufacturing) by requiring them to put half their capital in Tunisian hands and to set up a head office in Tunisia under a Tunisian director. Various French-owned industrial enterprises and lands totalling 150,000 acres were seized, and scores of Europeans—considered to be a potential fifth column—were arrested and either deported, interned, or jailed for illegal possession of arms. It seemed that rampant Tunisian nationalism was at last precluding Bourguiba's old dream of developing a modern society in close cooperation with the West.

The Bizerte crisis highlighted Tunisia's dependence upon some 3,000 French school-teachers, including 1,700 in French Mission schools. The success of Tunisia's educational reform was threatened. In 1958, the country had embarked on a revolutionary Ten Year Plan to provide six years of primary schooling for all children. Even more crucial for Tunisia's cultural development, the new educational system integrated all previously existing types of instruction into a modern curriculum relying heavily upon the French language.³

BIZERTE AND MODERATION

In the face of public opinion, Bourguiba bravely moderated his stand on Bizerte as the school year approached. In a statesmanlike gesture on September 8, immediately after the Belgrade Conference, he offered de Gaulle a peace settlement on the latter's terms. Construing the General's uncompromising com-

ments about Bizerte in a favorable light, Bourguiba dropped his demand immediately to negotiate the evacuation of the bases and instead offered to negotiate a return to the *status quo ante*. Prisoners were released, and on September 29, an agreement was signed stabilizing the French presence in Bizerte. After another round of negotiations, most of the French schoolteachers returned, though half the French Mission was incorporated into the national educational system and the remainder was transformed into a "cultural section" of the French Consulate.

As France continued to occupy its bases, the fighting of July seemed pointless in retrospect. Tunisians enthused by national self-sacrifice, the struggle against the vestiges of colonialism, and the rapprochement with Cairo and the Belgrade powers found it difficult to understand Bourguiba's abrupt retreat along the path of moderation. His unquestioned support within the Neo-Destour had always been based on his infallible reputation for political calculation. Now for the first time his actions seemed inconsistent and incomprehensible to many party stalwarts. Though full consultation within the party's hierarchy had preceded the initial blockade of the French bases, Bourguiba seems to have consulted very few of his associates before the peace overtures of September 8.

Divisions soon appeared in the party monolith.⁴ Mohamed Masmoudi, who previously had been considered a leader of the liberal francophile wing of the Neo-Destour, made a statement on his return from Cairo praising Nasser's austere style of living and thus implicitly criticizing Bourguiba's palaces. When in a long contemplated cabinet shuffle Bourguiba removed Masmoudi from the Department of Information and Tourism, an editorial (illustrated by a picture of King Farouk) in a weekly newspaper supported by Masmoudi brilliantly attacked Personal Power in single party states such as Tunisia. "Because [Personal Power] develops pride and disdain in him who possesses it, and docility and servility in others, it is in itself a menace to the moral health of a country."⁵ Never before in the young Republic's history had a

³ For a concise analysis of the reform, see Leon Carl Brown's contribution to *The Educated African* (Praeger 1962, compiled by Ruth Sloan).

⁴ For a contemporary analysis of the party's structure, see my article, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy? *World Politics*, April, 1962, pp. 461-482.

⁵ *Afrique-Action*, October 7, 1961. The newspaper was allowed to continue under a new name, *Jeune-Afrique*, with the same management. Its predecessor, *Action*, ceased publication for two years in September, 1958, when Masmoudi once before was in trouble and was expelled from the Political Bureau.

Tunisian newspaper made a frontal assault on Bourguiba. Ricocheting bullets from Bizerte seemed to be bringing the foundation of the regime under fire.

Though Mohamed Masmoudi's views found a sympathetic echo in educated public opinion, the editorial hardly constituted a serious political threat. In the Neo-Destour, men loyal to Bourguiba controlled the levers of power in the party apparatus and security services. In the last analysis, whatever they thought of his Bizerte policy, they were willing to follow their time-tested leader and help him preserve his mass support in the absence of a viable alternative.

Bourguiba cleverly weathered the political crisis by stimulating a measure of democratic discussion within the party to belie the picture of Personal Power depicted by Masmoudi. In a long and frank series of editorials, the party's official organ *El 'Amal* defended the regime and engaged in open polemic with Masmoudi's *Afrique-Action*. At party cadre meetings, militants discussed Personal Power and challenged Masmoudi. The hitherto quiescent National Assembly (Tunisia's parliament) received prominence as meetings between the deputies and their constituents were arranged. The stage set, the Political Bureau on November 17 expelled Masmoudi from the party for lack of discipline and coopted Ben Salah to replace him on the Bureau.

ECONOMIC PLANNING

While the Bizerte problem remained unsolved, party energies were refocused on the tasks of economic planning. Ben Salah's Ten-Year Perspectives, drafted in August, 1961, after preliminary consultations with various interested groups including even the students, were discussed in all of the party's thousand local branches. Bourguiba elaborated a doctrine of Neo-Destour socialism that accepted domestic and foreign private enterprise but subjected it to increased state control and supervision—ranging from price controls to more rigid import restrictions—in line with

national planning objectives. Private business interests were carefully courted and identified with the elaboration of the Plan, though those who remained hostile were neutralized in a reorganization of the party-controlled Tunisian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen (U.T.I.C.) in January, 1962.

Then in late March, as a further illustration of Neo-Destour democracy, the moribund National Council of the party was reactivated to discuss and approve Ben Salah's definitive Three Year Plan, ratified by the National Assembly two months later. Bourguiba thus succeeded in mobilizing the nation in support of the Plan, while at the same time avoiding any embarrassing discussions about Bizerte. The party's triennial congress, which was normally due to meet in March, 1962, was postponed until 1964 or 1965⁶ to celebrate the eventual French evacuation of the bases.

Tunisian efforts made little headway to secure from de Gaulle a timetable for evacuation. Talks in Rome in December and in Paris in January ended in deadlock. When on March 18, however, the Evian Agreements were signed, tensions over Bizerte thawed in the sunshine of approaching Algerian independence. In mid-July, 1962, just after Algeria became independent, Bourguiba's right-hand man, Bahi Ladgham, met de Gaulle and reported that the bases would all be evacuated within a year or so. As a conciliatory gesture, France released one installation to the Tunisians. France and Tunisia resumed diplomatic relations with an exchange of ambassadors at the end of the summer. With autumn came prospects for a long series of Franco-Tunisian negotiations, not only about the bases but also about the future of economic, cultural, and technical cooperation and the status of French properties and businesses in Tunisia. An atmosphere of good will seemed to prevail on both sides.

The combined effects of the Bizerte crisis and a severe drought seriously handicapped Tunisian efforts to develop the economy. The drought cut Tunisia's cereal production in half for 1961, thereby reducing exports by 70

⁶ As Bourguiba's speech of July 25, 1962, suggests.

per cent while causing Tunisia to step up food imports, and had even worse effects upon olive oil production, though a previous backlog helped to keep exports at a better than average level. Fortunately, the one-year customs agreement with France negotiated in October, 1960, continued in the absence of denunciation by either side to provide Tunisia with subsidized markets for its wheat and wine. However, Tunisia's balance of payments deficit in 1961 was roughly \$80 million, more than at any time since independence, and resulted in a net \$18 million decrease in its gold and foreign exchange reserves.⁷

Though agricultural prospects for 1962 were more favorable, the continued high level of imports coupled with the discontinuing of French expenditures at the Bizerte shipyard (resulting in a loss of work for 1,500 Tunisians) augured for 1962 an estimated balance of payments deficit of \$100 million and an additional \$20-25 million drain on reserves. Another considerable strain on the government's financial resources was its "Battle against underdevelopment" providing work for the unemployed. A record average of more than 200,000 workers were employed in 1961 and 1962 at an annual wage of \$30 million in addition to payments in kind of United States surplus wheat.

The Three Year Plan (1962-1964) called for an over-all gross investment of \$785 million, of which \$416 million was to come from domestic savings. In August, 1962, the United States announced a commitment of

⁷ The reserves stood at roughly \$100 million at the start of 1961.

⁸ Other governments were committed as follows: West Germany \$7.5 million, Italy \$10 million, I.B.R.D. and I.D.A. possibly \$20 million though only \$5 million had been committed, U.S.S.R. \$29 million, Poland \$10 million, Czechoslovakia \$10 million, Yugoslavia \$5 million. Private foreign investment plans consisted of an Italian oil refinery for \$15 million, Swedish phosphate plants for \$10 million, and oil exploration primarily by U.S. companies for \$15 million. The investment "gap" would possibly be filled by French aid or other private investment.

⁹ Until December 31, 1961, the United States had provided Tunisia with \$140.6 million, including \$96.1 million in grants.

¹⁰ *New York Times*, March 31, 1961. In Tunisia only *Afrique-Action* reported this curious bit of news. The exile was not a known political personality as Salah Ben Youssef had been.

\$180 million in support of the Plan. The Tunisians hoped that assistance from other governments and foreign private enterprise would total \$165 million, the remaining \$24 million coming out of Tunisia's gold and foreign exchange reserves. As of October, 1962, however, a gap of roughly \$34 million remained, even assuming that commitments were all translated into actual expenditures during the three-year period.⁸ Furthermore, the United States was hoping to finance specific projects with loans rather than providing indirect balance of payment support through grants, as in previous years, at the rate of \$20-25 million a year.⁹ Though the Tunisian economy had survived the double shock of drought and the Bizerte crisis, prospects for the full realization of the Three Year Plan did not appear overly bright without generous French assistance.

IN THE MAGHREB

While relations with France were improving, Tunisia's prospects in the Maghreb were less encouraging. Algerian independence removed the danger of armed East-West conflict in North Africa but raised a host of new problems. Though the idea of an Algerian-Moroccan Federation, raised in January, 1962, came to nothing in the following months, Bourguiba's chances of leading the way toward Maghreb unity appeared slight. In March the Moroccan government had even permitted a Tunisian exile to hold a press conference announcing a movement to combat "Bourguiba's dictatorship."¹⁰ Algeria's new leader, Ahmed Ben Bella, was known to bear Bourguiba a personal grudge for his alleged lack of cooperation six years previously.

Bourguiba appears to have backed the losing side in the power struggle that divided the Algerian Provisional Government immediately after independence. Certainly in Tunisian government circles there was widespread sympathy and respect for Premier Ben Khedda, the capable politician with a gift for compromise, as opposed to Ben Bella, with whom inevitable comparisons with Salah Ben Youssef were made when the former broke

with Ben Khedda. Speaking of Ben Bella and his "revolutionary" army friends, Bourguiba was reported to have asked: "What do they mean by this revolution? Do they see themselves as Castros or Maos? Haven't they read a little too much of *L'Express* and *France-Observateur*?"¹¹

When in early July the Provisional Government was attempting to control the external (Ben Bellist) Algerian Liberation Army based in Tunisia, army officers accused the Tunisians of cutting off its supplies. As the factional conflict deepened, however, Tunisia prudently avoided diplomatic recognition of the Ben Khedda government and attempted in late July to establish informal diplomatic contacts with the other side as well. In early October, after the legal establishment of Ben Bella's government, the Tunisian Ambassador finally journeyed to Algiers. But as long as Ben Bella and Bourguiba are both in power, relations between Algeria and Tunisia are apt to remain strained. Bourguiba seems quietly to have shelved his demands for part of the Algerian Sahara, but he remains ideologically "out of step" with his North African neighbors even with regard to the various pan-African movements.

Possible economies of scale perhaps point to measures of economic cooperation or integration among the North African countries, even if their economies are largely competitive rather than complementary. Bourguiba seems to favor a modest, functional approach to Maghreb unity rather than hasty and spectacular political promises that lead nowhere. For the time being, however, even modest proposals of economic cooperation may founder on political obstacles. Tunisia may instead be forced to make great ideological and material concessions or face being isolated and trapped in a Cairo-Algiers axis. On the other hand, it may turn out that Algeria's (and Egypt's) form of socialism in a single party state will have much in common with the flexible Neo-Destour variant of socialism that Bourguiba has launched.

¹¹ *La Presse* (Tunis), April 27, 1962, quoted from the *London Times*.

The key to Tunisia's future role in the Maghreb probably lies outside Tunisia, as before, in the evolution of Franco-Algerian relations. If the Evian Agreements are respected and not discarded by the Algerians as a neo-colonialist form of bondage, Bourguiba's old idea of a federated Maghreb co-operating closely with France may prove possible. Though the credit would probably not go to Bourguiba, the result might yet justify Bourguibism.

Whatever the outcome—and Tunisia's future is ultimately that of the Maghreb—Tunisia seems to have emerged internally intact from the Bizerte crisis. With the help of his party, Bourguiba regained his shaken prestige at home, avoided an irreparable breach with France, and set his country firmly on the path of planned economic development. Political stability remains Tunisia's greatest asset and may provide the basis for development by relatively democratic methods of persuasion in an atmosphere of broad consensus.

Tunisia has successfully channeled the nationalist enthusiasm for independence into a functioning concern for modernization. Though Bourguiba's regime has perhaps lost some of its emotional mass appeal and can no longer claim to lead the Maghreb, its weathering of the shock of Bizerte may have given it a new stability for the more routine tasks ahead.

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Discussing economic and political prospects in Libya, this author declares that "though social conditions arising from the rapidly changing economic situation constitute in the long run the major determinant of political development, other immediate factors affecting political change present themselves with more urgency." These are a dictatorial monarchy and "a small ruling class" that ". . . is committed to the status quo. . . ."

Libya's Pattern of Growth

By H. B. SHARABI

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RELATIVE TO its population (1.2 million), Libya is a large country (680,000 square miles); but most of its territory consists of desert and barren, uncultivable land. Over two-thirds of the population is rural and semi-nomadic, concentrated mainly in the narrow strip of productive land along the Mediterranean, with scattered settlements around the oases of the interior. In 1959-1960 the per capita income was about \$115, the lowest of any country bordering on the Mediterranean.

Modern Libya is the creation of the Italians, who today are blamed for most of Libya's ills. While it is true that Italy's 30-year occupation of Libya represents European colonization at its worst, it must be remembered that until its conquest by Italy in 1911 Libya had been a wasteland for nearly fourteen centuries, ever since its destruction as a flourishing Roman province in the sixth century A.D.

Between 1911 and 1943 Italy spent nearly a billion dollars on the reconstruction of Libya. Italian policy, it is true, aimed at converting Libya into an Italian colony to relieve the population pressure in the mainland and to establish a stepping-stone for

building its Mediterranean empire. The Libyans were treated with cruelty. When the Italians were pushed out of Libya in 1943, there was no more than a handful of Libyans with college degrees; and over 90 per cent of the population was wholly illiterate. But still they left behind a legacy of economic, administrative and technological progress which made it possible for Libya to survive as a separate political entity and eventually to become an independent state.

Of the 110,000 Italians living in Libya in 1941, less than 30,000 were left two decades later. In 1952, after independence, several hundred Italians were dismissed *en masse* from government service, and the government took an increasingly hostile attitude toward Italians remaining in Libya.

During the war Libya suffered severe damage as armies clashed across its territory. Poor, with scanty capital and primitive techniques, Libya was almost wholly dependent on outside aid after the war. During this period the two principal sources of financial support were the United States and Great Britain.

In the 1950's American financial aid was regulated by the Libyan-American agreement of 1954¹ for the establishment of the Wheelus

¹ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 8-9 (August-September, 1954), pp. 371-374.

air base near Tripoli. The agreement stipulated an initial payment by the United States of \$7 million, and an annual payment of \$4 million for five years, followed by \$1 million annually until 1970. This agreement was supplemented by an Economic and Military Aid Program which made available to Libya \$3 million in 1954, \$5 million in 1955, and \$7 million in 1956. Nearly 10,000 American servicemen and their dependents have settled in Libya since 1954.

Before receiving American aid, Libya depended almost exclusively on British support. Britain's position in Libya since the war has been the strongest of any power. On its part the Sanussi monarchy sees in Great Britain the strongest bulwark of Libyan independence and the best protection against possible Italian encroachment. Britain's present influence in Libya is indirect but deeply felt, especially in financial affairs.

In 1953 a "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance"² was signed between Great Britain and Libya, which paved the way for an economic agreement whereby Libya was to receive \$7.6 million annually for budgetary support and \$2.8 million for economic reconstruction. According to a revision of this agreement in 1958 Britain's annual payments were lowered to \$1.4 million until 1963.

So far Libya has refrained from accepting aid from the Soviet Union, with which diplomatic relations were established in 1956. In 1958 rumor of a Soviet offer of \$28 million in aid did not materialize; perhaps coincidentally, United States payments to Libya were considerably increased at about that time.

LIBYAN OIL

The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Libya was revolutionary in impact.

² Text in *ibid.*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 11 (November 1953), pp. 457-458.

³ See *International Oilman*, Vol. XIV, No. 9 (1960), p. 246.

⁴ Government of Libya, Petroleum Commission, *Petroleum Development in Libya, 1954 through mid-1960* (Tripoli, 1960), p. 13.

⁵ In 1962 twenty-one companies had received oil concessions in Libya (see *The Oil and Gas Journal*, August 27, 1962, p. 64). The first company in which Libyan nationals held a majority interest of 51 per cent was in process of formation in 1962.

From having been one of the poorest countries on the Mediterranean, Libya promised almost overnight to become one of the largest oil-producing countries in the world. The same miracle that had taken place on the Persian Gulf a few years earlier now took place on the Mediterranean.

The story of the discovery of oil in Libya is one of the most dramatic in the annals of oil exploration. As late as 1957 oil experts were sceptical as to the presence of oil in any sizeable quantities in Libya. They still believed that "there was no positive evidence that oil in commercial quantities even existed."³ The first oil concession was granted in November, 1955,⁴ and the first exploratory well was spudded on April 30, 1956, in Northern Cyrenaica. The first strike took place at Atshan, in Cyrenaica, but the well tested for no more than 500 barrels per day. The following year two more strikes were made, at Bahi and Dahra (about 70 miles from Sidri on the Bay of Sirte), with wells testing for 700 b.p.d. and 1000 b.p.d. respectively.

In 1959, the major strike was made by Esso. It took place at "Zelton No. 1," about 110 miles inland from Ras el Brega on the Bay of Sirte, with a flow of 17,000 b.p.d., or 34 times as much as the flow from the first strike. By July, 1962, 213 productive wells were drilled with a test-rated production potential of over 300,000 b.p.d. It is now estimated that oil production in Libya will reach an average of 340,000 b.p.d. in 1963, 470,000 in 1964, and 500,000 in 1965. It is expected that by 1967 production will be very close to one million barrels a day. A conservative estimate of Libya's oil revenues for the period 1962-1965 is put at over \$400 million. Next year (1964) Libya's income from oil will average over \$120 per capita, which constitutes an increase of almost 100 per cent. This is double the 1960 per capita figure for Saudi Arabia and seven times that of Iran.

In her dealings with the oil companies⁵ Libya has made full use of the experience of the other oil-producing countries in the Middle East. An elaborate Petroleum Law was promulgated in 1955 and a Petroleum Commission was set up with a well-thought out or-

ganizational structure and planning board. Under the Petroleum Law⁶ Libya receives an equal share of profits by way of fees, rents, taxes, royalties and surtaxes "as will make the total of the [company's] payments equal to 50 per cent of such profits" (Article 14). An important provision, which is a significant improvement over similar provisions in other Middle Eastern countries, sets progressive time limits on the holding of concession areas. This fact is in large part responsible for accelerating the search for oil since 1956 and for the amount of money annually spent by the oil companies. This provision (Article 10) stipulates that 25 per cent of the concession area granted to any company is to be relinquished after a period of five years from the date of the concession, another 25 per cent after eight years and a further 25 per cent (of certain concession areas) in ten years. In September, 1962, 54 tracts totaling more than 80,000 square miles were relinquished by concession holders (who had received their concessions five years earlier) and offered for new lease by the Petroleum Commission.

Another important provision is included in Clause 18 of the "Deed of Concession," which gives Libya a significant role in the future development of the oil industry. Libyan subjects employed by the oil company are to constitute after ten years from the date of commencement of operations "at least 75 per cent of the total number of persons employed by the company in Libya." It is further stipulated that "from the date of commencement of regular export from Libya of petroleum in commercial quantities," the company is to make annual payments to the Libyan government for the training of Libyan subjects "in order to fit them for employment in the petroleum industry or in related undertakings."

DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

In 1960 the Libyan government established a Development Council to supervise and co-ordinate economic development and allocated

to it 70 per cent of the total revenues from oil. According to present estimates, the Council will have at its disposal nearly \$300 million by 1965, which is over 400 per cent larger than the amount estimated by the World Bank Economic Mission for the period 1961-1965.

Following the recommendations of the World Bank, the Council is expected to allocate these funds as follows:

1. Public utilities (transportation, communications, power, urban water supply): 40 per cent;
2. Agriculture, including conservation of soil and water: 30 per cent;
3. Education, health, housing, sanitation and welfare: 30 per cent.

Recent economic surveys of Libya have all emphasized agriculture as the basis of any long-range economic development scheme. As stated in a recent unpublished report by the International Monetary Fund: "Despite recent important gains in oil exploration and production, agriculture remains the backbone of Libya's economy." The Libyan government, however, has so far tended to give industry more priority than have the economic experts.

Compared with Kuwait or Qatar, Libya's long-term outlook seems promising. It has other natural resources besides oil and no problem of under-population. It is believed that with adequate planning and proper application of capital such physical obstacles to development as water shortage, soil erosion, and primitive techniques can be overcome. This, however, does not mean that money and planning hold by themselves the solution to Libya's economic future. For many years to come, Libya's productive capacity will remain extremely limited. Lack of administrative experience, shortage of trained personnel, weak government organization are serious limitations which will not only diminish the effectiveness of planning and execution but also severely hamper fruitful investment in large-scale productive schemes.

Ironically, what will most probably happen in Libya is that with the increase of income from oil proportionally less money will be

⁶ Amended by two Royal Decrees, on July 3 and November 9, 1961, introducing no fundamental changes but providing however for more favorable terms to Libya in determining its share of income from oil.

Federal Budgets, 1958/1959-1962/1963

(in million Libyan pounds; 1 Libyan Pound = \$2.80)

Fiscal yr.	1958-1959 (actual)	1960-1961 (estimate)	1961-1962 (estimate)	1962-1963 (estimate)
<i>Revenues</i>	<u>13.78</u>	<u>19.96</u>	<u>20.18</u>	<u>19.6</u>
Domestic revenue	7.12	9.92	13.35	12.8
External Aid	6.66	10.04	6.82	6.8
<i>Expenditures</i>	<u>12.08</u>	<u>19.96</u>	<u>23.00</u>	<u>19.6</u>
Operational expenditures	4.67	5.80	9.67	10.4
Grants to Provinces	2.37	6.17	9.49	9.2
Grants for development	2.05	7.99	3.84	---

spent on development and more will be allowed to accumulate as balances in foreign countries. This tendency is enhanced by Libya's already severe inflation, which affects development spending and is itself affected by it. From the standpoint of development, inflation leads to progressively higher and higher prices which the government has to pay for land, labor, technicians, construction material and whatever development projects require. Thus in order to obtain the same amount of real resources, expenditures on developing resources will increase from year to year, which means an increasingly heavy drain on public revenues and consequently the slowing down of governmental implementation of development schemes. All this leads to more inflationary pressure on both the expenditure and the production sides of the economy, resulting in a slower increase in real output.

There is already a drift of skilled labor to the oil industry, which is accentuating the acute problem of shortage of skilled labor and personnel. Agriculture workers are also leaving the land to work in the cities, creating in turn a shortage of labor in agriculture. Yet agriculture is the most important sector of the economy from the long-range view.

Inflation and the growth of urban popula-

tion are creating the same social and political problems already witnessed in other oil producing countries of the Middle East. Laborers, government employees and other salaried groups whose income is relatively inflexible have already begun to feel the pinch resulting from the rise in the cost of living as their income remains constant or increases at a slower rate.

The maldistribution in income is likely to increase rather than decrease as the present inflationary spiral continues. It will manifest itself not only in such adverse economic effects as weakening the incentive to work, lowering health standards and thereby the productivity of labor, but also in social dislocation, loss of communal cohesion, and the rise of political discontent.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Though social conditions arising from the rapidly changing economic situation constitute in the long run the major determinant of political development, other immediate factors affecting political change present themselves with more urgency. These mostly center around the Sanussi monarchy, up to now the repository of real power in the state and the symbol of Libya's unity. Libya, like Jordan, is internally divided; its political

structure is based on a compromise for which it pays the vast cost of maintaining three provincial governments: one for Tripolitania (*Tarablus*), one for Cyrenaica (*Barqa*) and one for the Fezzan (*Fazzan*), all of which enjoy considerable internal autonomy. And to allay regional jealousies, the federal government has to maintain two capitals, Tripoli in Tripolitania and Benghazi in Cyrenaica.⁷

The Sanussi movement, one of the rallying points of the struggle against Italian domination, has lost its dynamism. Like the Hashimites of Iraq and Jordan, the Sanussis of Libya have no firm foundation as a ruling dynasty. The royal house has already lost its mass support and has been identified with a small ruling class and with the British. The old and ailing King Idriss has made no adequate provision for the perpetuation of Sanussi power in Libya; on the contrary, he has deliberately weakened the solidarity of the royal family by his internal policies. The crown-prince, a nephew of the king, has no popular appeal and little aptitude to rule.

Political power in Libya is concentrated, as it is in all other monarchical regimes of the Middle East, in the king and the small group representing the aristocratic families, the big merchants and the tribal chiefs. This group constitutes the bulwark of the monarchical regime, but it also represents its greatest liability in the long run. It is committed to the *status quo* in so far as it represents aristocratic privilege and monopoly of political and economic power. Incapable of introducing radical reform, the regime resorts to repression in order to maintain power. No opposition is tolerated in the country, political parties are banned and strikes are prohibited.

So far the two sources of upheaval and revolution in the political life of the Middle East, the students and the army, have remained calm in Libya. As in Saudi Arabia, the army is kept small in size and poor in equipment; up to now it has shown no signs of disloyalty. The students, i.e., the articulate core of the intelligentsia, still constitute a

minor force in the country, but it is rapidly growing in strength. The predominant ideology among the more educated groups is the *Baath* (Arab Resurrection Party) version of Arab nationalism, which is strongly socialist in orientation and radically nationalist in sentiment.

Another potentially explosive force in political life is the expanding labor group which is already organized in the Federation of Labor Unions. Under the influence of the Tunisian labor movement, the best organized and most effective in the Arab world, the F.L.U. may play an important role in Libya's political development.

It should be noted in conclusion that at this stage the vast majority of Libyans have no developed sense of nationhood and are still little capable of organized political action. With the social and economic change now taking place, however, both the idea of Arab nationalism and the sense of Libyan identity are bound to crystallize and exert significant influence on political attitudes and behavior.

The present political tendency among the intellectuals may give a hint of future development: While paying lip service to the principle of Arab nationalism and unity they are developing a growing awareness of Libya's identity and character; they tend more and more to think of Libya as a separate entity with its own interests and needs. It is unlikely that Libya would want to enter into any unitary arrangement either in the direction of the North African Maghreb or in the direction of Egypt and the East Arab World. If tiny Kuwait has succeeded in upholding her independence and preserving for herself the exclusive right of enjoying her oil wealth, there is no reason why Libya should fail to achieve the same goal.

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⁷ Beida, until it genuinely becomes the nation's sole capital, now represents a third capital.

"Jolted out of a self-imposed isolation by late nineteenth-century imperialism and two world wars, Ethiopia has been propelled into the maelstrom of world politics by the Cold War, the formation of African blocs and dreams of Pan-Africanism."

Ethiopia's Troubled Future

By RAYFORD W. LOGAN
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ETHIOPIA,¹ THE oldest of the independent African nations, is one of the most backward. The rulers' policy of isolation from the outside world until the late nineteenth century deprived them and the people of knowledge which might have reduced centuries-old retardation. Late nineteenth-century imperialism rudely awakened Abyssinia from its long sleep. But it created a fear of intercourse with foreign nations which, however justifiable, still accounts in part for Emperor Haile Selassie's belated, unenthusiastic efforts to modernize the nation.

During some 2,500 years of independence the early institutions of an absolute monarchy, a powerful priesthood, a military apparatus, a landed aristocracy and a large number of serfs became so deeply rooted and widely accepted that today they resist radical changes. Even the outward manifestations of a medieval absolutism prevail: those who come before the Emperor must prostrate themselves before the "King of Kings, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God."²

¹ Ethiopia is now the official name for the country once known as Abyssinia.

² Ethiopian rulers claim descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba.

³ Ernest Work, *Ethiopia, A Pawn in European Diplomacy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935).

⁴ For a lively, documented account of the international situation which facilitated the conquest, see Frederick L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve: The Crisis of Diplomacy, 1933-1939* (New York and London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), pp. 157-172, 176-201, 221-230.

Menelik II began the "modernization" of Abyssinia. In 1889, he established his dominion over rival claimants to the throne and subdued rebellious tribes. Menelik built a new capital at Addis Ababa, introduced the first telephones, postal service, electric lights and government school. The palace intrigues which won for a French company the concession to construct a railway from Jibuti in French Somaliland to Addis Ababa confirmed his suspicion of foreign nationals and made him wary of accepting additional financial and technical assistance. He maintained independence largely because France, Britain, and Italy could not achieve a tripartite agreement for the partitioning of his country.³

The death of Menelik in 1913 led to a new struggle for power among the Abyssinian chieftains. Three years later Ras Tafari, son of a nephew of Menelik, proclaimed himself Regent; in 1930 he assumed the title of Emperor. Haile Selassie shrewdly undertook reforms designed to quiet harsh foreign criticism and demands within the country for some restraints on his absolutism. In 1931 he gave Ethiopia its first constitution, which provided for a bicameral legislature, a judiciary and a budget. He perhaps planned to modernize the constitution gradually. Before he could do so, Mussolini began an invasion in the fall of 1935 that led to a rapid conquest completed in May, 1936.⁴

The balance sheet of the Italian five-year occupation of Ethiopia is difficult to assess.

Nazi Germany's brutal extermination of millions of Jews made the blinding, torture and killing of thousands of Ethiopians seem almost insignificant. Italy vastly improved the roads and measurably developed medical organization; established elementary, technical and agricultural schools; explored the mineral and agricultural resources; erected factories and electric-generating stations.

When Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa in May, 1941, five years after his departure, he must have had few illusions about the good intentions of the Western Powers. To be sure, it was Britain that had granted him refuge, and it was largely British troops who drove the Italians out of the country. But the Emperor probably knew that the expulsion of the Italians was dictated more by considerations of global strategy than by a desire to restore him to his throne.

Selassie was too intelligent to remain embittered against the nations which deserted him and then succored him; too traditionalist to want to see the ancient regime disappear in his lifetime; too practical to try to make his medieval kingdom, in a short span of time, a modern nation.

THE EMPEROR RETURNS

On November 2, 1941, he convened the parliament provided for in the 1931 constitution. An imperial decree of August 27, 1942, divided the country into twelve provinces,⁵ districts and subdistricts. The Emperor appoints the governors-general and practically all the other administrative officials. The mayors of all the municipalities except Addis Ababa are responsible to the governor where the municipality is located. Local government outside the larger cities is virtually non-existent.

A new constitution, promulgated by the Emperor in 1955, indicates the Emperor's desire to "make haste slowly." The Senate, an advisory body of princes and chieftains appointed by Haile Selassie, is an inadequate

substitute for a cabinet, responsible to a majority in a popularly elected legislature.

The House of Deputies, also an advisory body, was elected by a very small percentage of voters who could meet a property qualification. Since 1957, the 210 members of this House have been elected by "universal suffrage." Since political parties are banned and since only a small number of Ethiopians are literate, elections can hardly be described as "representative"; revolution, therefore, seems to offer the most likely means of changing the status quo.

The legal and judicial system is as antiquated as are the executive and legislative branches. One code is based upon the Mosaic retaliatory law of talion, "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"; the second, steeped in old Roman canon law, deals with both religious and secular matters. The Emperor is the "Supreme Court," who holds judicial hearings somewhat after the fashion of Louis XI of France.

Ethiopia's economic backwardness has derived less from lack of natural resources than from the rulers' reluctance, until recently, to accept foreign aid. It was feared that aid might threaten the nation's independence and undermine the Emperor's authoritarian rule. Since the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the emergence of the newly independent nations of Africa, however, Haile Selassie has found it not only expedient but necessary to accept foreign aid. Otherwise, these new nations might reveal in too glaring a manner the relative backwardness of his old empire.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

Some of Ethiopia's economic potential is proven and some is speculative. Ethiopia is said to have more arable land than any other state or territory in East Africa. United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams declared at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Washington on October 12, 1962: "One of our economists estimates that the Ethiopian highlands alone, if properly cultivated, could produce sufficient food for all of Western Europe."⁶ The Food and Agriculture Or-

⁵ There are now 13 provinces. See Imperial Ethiopian government, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, *Economic Review* (February, 1962), p. 97, footnote. Hereafter cited as *Economic Review*.

⁶ Department of State Press Release No. 618, October 12, 1962, p. 4.

ganization has expressed the belief that, if diseases which kill millions of cattle could be overcome, Ethiopia could provide sufficient meat for its entire population.

Several years ago Haile Selassie authorized an agricultural and extension training program under the auspices of the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College. United States experts under the aegis of various government agencies have joined with the F.A.O. and the Oklahoma A. and M. College in programming the use of machinery, co-operative farming and improved methods of processing and marketing coffee, the chief cash crop. In February, 1961, Ethiopia signed an agreement with the United Nations to finance a three-year survey of the Awash River Valley, including the Danakil Desert. In addition a British company continued work on a plan to irrigate the lower reaches of the Awash River for planting cotton and other cash crops.⁷

Ethiopia, including Eritrea,⁸ has sizable proven quantities of nickel ore, copper, coal, potash, gold and platinum and small quantities of molybdenum, beryl, arsenopyrite, tungsten, cobalt, chromite, manganese, oil, copper, asbestos, and sulphur.⁹ Few of these, however, are being sufficiently exploited to aid measurably the industrialization of the country. Since 1950, the Emperor has encouraged foreign capital investments by exempting new enterprises from taxes on profits for five years and by waiving customs duties on machinery imported for new factories. A 20 page advertisement section in *The New York Times*,

⁷ *Economic Review*, pp. 71-77.

⁸ The former Italian colony of Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 as the result of a United Nations agreement. This agreement, which re-established Ethiopian rule, provided Ethiopia with much needed ports at Massawa and Assab on the Red Sea.

⁹ George H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), I, 296-369, *passim*.

¹⁰ United Nations, *African Statistics (Annex to the Economic Bulletin for Africa)* Vol. II, No. 1, January, 1962, pp. 46, 96-97. It is too early to determine the effect of the agreement arrived at by the United Nations Conference, July 9-August 25, 1962, to stabilize the price of coffee by curtailing production and gradually reducing surpluses. For the agreement, see *Africa Report*, October, 1962, p. 23.

November 4, 1962, made a deft public-relations appeal to American investors.

A careful reading shows progress and potential but also the long way that Ethiopia has to go now in order to catch up with the more progressive new African nations. For example, during 1961, total industrial production accounted for only about 5 per cent of the national income. Foreign private capital has built cotton textile factories and sugar refineries, but the Ethiopian government has been compelled to develop transportation, communications and hydro-electric power. Investments in manufacturing industries within Ethiopia rose from \$3.6 million in 1955 to almost \$11 million in 1961; expected investments for 1962 and 1963 are \$12 million and \$14 million, respectively.

Ethiopia's Second Five Year Plan (1963-1967) calls for establishing new industries to produce such varied goods as woolen cloth, blankets, rayon piece goods, canvas and rubber shoes, paper, glass and ceramics, plastics, paints, dyes, iron bars and rods and agricultural implements. The expected investment costs for known manufacturing projects total \$69.3 million. This is a small sum for a population estimated in 1962 at 20 million.

A profile of Ethiopia's foreign trade gives further evidence of the slow rate of economic development. The value of imports increased steadily, except for a small decline in 1956, from \$29.5 million in 1950 to \$88.3 million in 1960. The value of exports rose from \$29 million in 1950 to \$86.1 million in 1957, declined to \$61.9 million in 1958, rose to \$72.9 million in 1959 and to \$78 million in 1960. Coffee has annually provided the highest component, rising from \$13.1 million in 1950 to \$45.6 million in 1960. But the recent decline in the price of coffee on the world market, due in large measure to the great increase in the use of robusta coffee from new African nations for instant coffee, has more than offset the expansion of Ethiopia's coffee exports. In 1957 when Ethiopia exported 44,200 metric tons of coffee, the value was \$43.6 million; in 1960 when Ethiopia exported 53,700 metric tons, the value was \$46 million.¹⁰

All the other principal exports were also agricultural commodities. In the order of their value in 1960 they were lentils, raw hides, chat, sheep skins, linseed, sesame and noug, goat skins, horse beans, and castor seed. Their export value ranged from \$4.6 million to \$0.92 million.¹¹

Despite the encouragement given to new industrial enterprises, machinery and transport constituted only 26.5 per cent, 28.9 per cent and 24.4 per cent of the total value of imports in 1958, 1959, and 1960 respectively. Imports of food, beverages and tobacco had almost the same value as did mineral fuels, about 10 per cent for the first three combined and a little over 10 per cent for the mineral fuels. The need for additional textile mills in Ethiopia is seen in the fact that textiles accounted for 23.9 per cent, 21.4 per cent and 23.3 per cent of total imports during the three years respectively.¹²

While Ethiopia is thus hardly more than at the "take-off" stage of economic development, increased port facilities at Assab and programmed expansion of the Ethiopian Airlines should measurably step up the country's belated awakening.¹³

EDUCATION

An antiquated political structure, isolation and a sluggish economy have handicapped modernization of an outmoded educational system. The religiosity of the Coptic Church, the Koranic and Roman Catholic schools stultified education until 1908 when Menelik set up the first public primary school in the capital. After the Italian occupation, Haile Selassie had to begin making educational bricks almost without straws.

In his assault upon illiteracy he has encountered problems similar to those in other

developing countries: a population almost 90 per cent illiterate, a small number of adequately trained indigenous teachers and the high cost of sorely needed foreign teachers, insufficient funds, valid disagreements about the goals and the language of instruction, the almost inevitable gulf between the educated few and the illiterate masses, the need for increasing the number of girls in school.

In 1960-1961, of a school population estimated at 3,200,000, some 186,000 were in government schools. The vast majority, about 140,000, were in the first four grades, 36,000 in grades five to eight, 8,500 in grades nine to twelve, and fewer than 1,000 in grades thirteen to sixteen. About one-third of all students in government schools were in Addis Ababa and Eritrea; this percentage increased in the grades above the first four. In addition, some 300,000 were in religious schools.¹⁴

On December 18, 1961, Haile Selassie officially handed over the palace grounds, his ancestral palace and official residence to the newly established Haile Selassie I University as a "free gift" to the Ethiopian people. The University, established with financial and professional help from the United States and other friendly nations, incorporated the existing colleges, namely, the University College, the College of Engineering, the Building College, the College of Agricultural and Mechanical Arts, the Public Health College and Training Center, and the Theological College of the Holy Trinity. These colleges had been established in 1950, 1953, 1954, 1958, 1954, and 1960 respectively.¹⁵

United States government agencies, the University of Utah, and Oklahoma University have measurably aided the educational programs and are committed to continuing aid. Some 230 Peace Corps volunteers from the United States went to Ethiopia in the fall of 1962 to teach. Some 625 Ethiopian students have received degrees, diplomas and special training in American and Canadian institutions since the late 1940's.¹⁶ Others have studied in Western European countries and in Russia.

For the fiscal year ending July 7, 1962, the Ethiopian government had budgeted E\$21.6

¹¹ United Nations, *African Statistics*, p. 97.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹³ *Economic Review*, p. 55.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154; *New York Times*, "Ethiopia, Land of Promise," (Advertisement), Section 13, November 4, 1962, p. 14.

¹⁵ *Economic Review*, pp. 52, 54.

¹⁶ "Ethiopia, Land of Promise," p. 14. For an illuminating discussion, see *The Educated African*, compiled by Ruth Sloan Associates and edited by Helen Kitchen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 114-127.

million for education or 13.25 per cent of the estimated total ordinary expenditure. This was 11 per cent less than the amount budgeted for national defense.¹⁷

NEUTRALISM

Jolted out of a self-imposed isolation by late nineteenth-century imperialism and two world wars, Ethiopia has been propelled into the maelstrom of world politics by the Cold War, the formation of African blocs and dreams of Pan-Africanism.

Haile Selassie has played, with some skill, the game of non-alignment *vis-à-vis* the Nato and Soviet blocs. A romantic attachment to Russia derives from the belief, held by many scholars, that Alexander Pushkin, the great nineteenth century lyric poet, was the great grandson of an Abyssinian general in the Russian army. Russia capitalized on this sentiment after World War II and at one time had the largest number of "diplomatic" officials, medical and cultural personnel in Addis Ababa. In the summer of 1959, the Emperor made state visits to the United Arab Republic, the U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia; he is reported to have received a grant of \$100 million from Russia and a smaller grant from Czechoslovakia. He also obtained a small grant from Yugoslavia.

Evidently for the purpose of showing his non-alignment, Haile Selassie also visited Belgium, France, Portugal and West Germany, from the last of which he also obtained a small grant. Economic aid from the United States amounted to \$72.5 million from 1946 to 1960 and military aid, to \$42.5 million. One of the more important dividends accruing to Ethiopia from this gamesmanship was the decision of the United States to aid in the construction of Haile Selassie I University.

Three Ethiopian divisions, small air and navy units fought with valor with other United Nations troops during the Korean War, 1950-1953, and other forces have constituted an important component of United Na-

tions troops in the Congo. The United States maintains a military telecommunications base in Ethiopian Eritrea and the Ethiopian Airlines are operated by American pilots. But Haile Selassie has attempted to balance foreign interests in Africa: "Yugoslav engineers act as make-weight to the Italian engineers installing a hydroelectric plant on the Awash River; British firms are favored alternately with Americans; Norwegian military advisors are juxtaposed to Swedish officers."¹⁸

Ethiopia was one of the first African states to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and has received trade, investment, technical and cultural assistance from Israel, partly to offset Nasser's famous boast that he would support liberation movements in Africa south of the Sahara. Haile Selassie probably accepted aid from Israel as a warning to the strong pro-Arab support for the "nationalistic" claims of Somalia to a large slice of the Ethiopian province of Ogaden. It is too early to guess whether the recent Chinese attack on India, which Ethiopia condemned, will strengthen the Emperor's tilting of his non-alignment policy toward more general support of the United States and its allies.

One should also be wary about assessing the Emperor's role in the fluid blocs of the emerging African nations, although even before the December, 1960, abortive revolt he tended to align himself with the Union of African States and Malagasy and the Monrovia bloc against the Casablanca bloc of Nasser, Nkrumah and Sékou Touré.

Equally difficult are the questions of Western influence on the abortive December, 1960, plot against Haile Selassie, and of the effect of this plot on the future political development of Ethiopia. It has been reported that the

(Continued on page 54)

Rayford W. Logan, head of the history department at Howard University, has studied African affairs for more than 30 years. As a Fulbright Research Fellow, he studied the French administration of overseas territories in Paris. His books include *The African Mandates in World Politics* and *The Negro and the Post-War World*.

¹⁷ *Economic Review*, p. 94. The Ethiopian dollar is equal to \$.40 of the American dollar.

¹⁸ Leo Silberman, "The Horn of Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (July, 1959), 659.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Algeria in the United Nations

On October 4, 1962, the United Nations Security Council voted 10 to 0 with 1 abstention (Republic of China) to recommend the admission of Algeria to the United Nations. The General Assembly admitted Algeria to membership by acclamation on October 8. The partial text of the October 4 statement by United States Security Council Representative Adlai E. Stevenson follows:

The United States joins enthusiastically in the congratulations to the Government and people of Algeria on their independence and on the establishment of their new Government. We share the universal joy that has been here expressed that this long, exhausting, and fratricidal conflict is over, and that a new day has dawned, and that ancient France and new Algeria, and all their mutual friends and admirers, can now look forward to peace and progress instead of bitterness and bloodshed.

* * *

A tragic struggle has ended, and great honor is due to those who worked with patience and foresight and with steady purpose to end the Algerian war. The settlement signed at Evian, we believe, is worthy of the brave men who struggled to make it for so long, but independence is not an end—it is only a beginning. We know only too well from our own history that the period of transition from dependence to independence is bound to be difficult. When the struggle has been bitter and has been long, the difficulties of readjustment are compounded. The wisdom and courage of General de Gaulle, the moderation and sagacity of Algeria's leaders, the forbearance of the Moslem population during the troubled months of bloody and lawless attempts to subvert the peace in Algeria have all won admiration throughout the world.

Soon we shall welcome here to the United Nations the first Prime Minister of independent Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella. He and his

associates have earned our admiration and deserve our encouragement for their efforts to insure the security and the tranquillity of their people, to organize an effective administration, and to pave the way for economic recovery and development.

For the United States the struggle in Algeria has been over the years the occasion for much soul searching. France is our oldest ally. We share many memories and common experience. We are happy, therefore, that the independence of Algeria finally came about with the positive participation of France.

No less satisfying to us was the decision of the people of Algeria, who voted on 1 July in favor of independence in cooperation with France. Both countries have put on record their willingness to continue to cooperate as sovereign partners. Algeria's leaders have expressed the hope that those of European origin in Algeria will continue to participate in the challenge and the constructive work that lie ahead.

* * *

The demonstrated capacity and character of the Algerian people and of their leaders gives us reason to expect that Algeria will play a distinguished part in helping discharge the heavy responsibilities that fall to each member of the United Nations in this difficult period of history. Therefore, we shall vote with pleasure for the draft resolution recommending Algeria's admission to membership in the United Nations.

BOOK REVIEWS

Books on Africa . . .

AFRICA. A HANDBOOK TO THE CONTINENT. Edited by COLIN LEGUM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 553 pages and index, \$15.00.)

This "handbook to the continent" offers a comprehensive source book and guide to Africa. Each analysis (some 54 countries are covered) gives historical background, political and economic developments, and a short biographical resumé of the leading personalities in each country. Detailed maps accompany the discussions.

The second section is devoted to general summary essays on education, art, religion and culture. The 40 contributors are well-known specialists and have provided illuminating and sound, if brief, studies.

NEW FORCES IN AFRICA. By WILLIAM H. LEWIS. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962. 132 pages and references, \$3.25.)

The ten papers in this collection are the result of a colloquium on Africa in 1961 at Georgetown University. They are devoted to critical analyses of the "most vital forces and issues to have emerged in Africa in recent years." The essays offer a scholarly and thorough examination of nationalism, Pan-Africanism, economics and politics and the European impact on Africa.

BRUTAL MANDATE. A JOURNEY TO SOUTH WEST AFRICA. By ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN. With a foreword by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt. (New York: Macmillan, 1962. 257 pages, \$5.00.)

In the summer of 1959, three young men traveled to South Africa. From there they entered South West Africa to gather evidence to present an appeal in 1959 before the United Nations Committee on South West Africa on the suffering of the people

of this territory, administered by South Africa.

This book traces the personal experiences of Lowenstein and his two companions, in circumventing the government's restrictions to meet secretly with African tribal leaders to hear their side of the story. The result is a sympathetic and well-told tale of the Africans' suppression.

ANGOLA: A SYMPOSIUM. VIEWS OF A REVOLT. (London: Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1962. 160 pages, \$2.25.)

The ten articles in this collection offer a very interesting balance sheet of the situation in Angola and Portugal's colonial policies. In the introduction, Philip Mason notes that it was not possible to find contributors without pre-committed points of view, either for or against Dr. Salazar's government. To provide objectivity, therefore, this symposium offers detailed information, presented "from different angles."

The result is an informative study by critics and supporters of Angola policy.

A HISTORY OF AFRICA. By DONALD L. WIEDNER. (New York: Random House, 1962. 578 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.95.)

In his history of Africa below the Sahara, the author divides his material into three sections. Book one discusses the origins of the peoples, early history, and the coming of the Europeans through the first half of the nineteenth century. Book two covers European imperialism in Africa after 1860 until about 1914. Book three deals with Africa in the last 50 years, the demands of a rising nationalism and the coming of independence.

The book is a useful text for an understanding of the problems Africans have faced, and will continue to face. T.H.B.

PAN-AFRICANISM

Continued from page 7

ing the Sahara divide North Africa from the rest of the continent; and the U.A.R., which entertained the third A.A.P.C. at Cairo in March, 1961, particularly regards itself as a member of a steadily growing "African nationalist community of nations."¹⁵

A difficult problem is inherent in the fact that the attainment and consolidation of "national" independence is a component of Pan-Africanism. Some scholars have posed the question whether African nationalism endangers Pan-African objectives. They point out that "territorial national movements, which have been and remain the instrumentalities for the realization of Pan-African objectives, . . . acquire a dynamism and an autonomy of their own sufficient to constitute a countervailing force, militating against the larger political unity envisaged by the founders and long-time exponents of Pan-Africanism." They maintain that the Africans' rejection of large-scale violence and their use of the institutional channels provided by the European administrators for achieving the independence of individual colonial territories contributed to the nationalization of Pan-Africanism, as did the strong socialist component of Pan-African doctrine.¹⁶

Numerous and powerful forces militate against the possibility of Pan-African unification. Not only have historical, linguistic, and cultural differences existed among African peoples, but the colonial heritage comprises difficulties not easily surmounted. Disagreements and mutual suspicions and rivalries

are as common among African leaders as among any large group of men from diverse backgrounds, each with his own aspirations and problems. Sparse communication and transportation services in Africa impede leaders wishing to confer frequently.

Pan-Africanists, however, indicate that there are just as many forces pulling them together. A typical list would include their desire for unity, the world trend toward larger states and state associations (the United States and the European Community have impressed many Africans), the existence of all-African and regional African organizations, their common fear of dependence on the superpowers, mutual hatred of South Africa, the common experience of colonialism, belief in a common store of culture and art, claim to a special African mission to advance peace and civilization, and the opportunity to mold African youth through the educational programs being instituted.¹⁷

Perhaps the most profound problem is that of the relation between African tradition and Pan-Africanism. The historical experiences, beliefs, and customs of the indigenous societies remain significant realities for many Africans. David Apter, holding that a religion or cosmology is essential to a civilization, maintains that Pan-Africanism feels threatened by African tradition but is incapable of being a substitute for it. Thus he argues that Pan-Africanism "offers emancipation from belief" and endows the state with "a special meaning."¹⁸ It would, however, be rash to predict how Africa's fluid forms will crystallize. Having returned to its inspirational home, Pan-Africanism is now more subject to African realities and the world forces that affect them than to any doctrines that would disregard them.

¹⁵ *The Egyptian Economic & Political Review*, 7, 4 (April 1961), 13, 15.

¹⁶ David Apter and James Coleman, "Pan-Africanism or Nationalism in Africa," in *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered*, pp. 89-97. Most African leaders advocate a form of socialism, but they assert that the content they give it is not the same as that understood by Communists and many Western socialists.

¹⁷ List adapted from keynote address of John A. Davis to the third AMSAC conference, *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered*, p. 33.

¹⁸ *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 6-7.

SOCIALISM IN THE U.A.R.

Continued from page 12

the two countries may be regarded as relatively satisfactory.

Soviet Russia's relations with Egypt have passed through several phases since purposeful Soviet overtures to the Arab states began

in the 1950's. Soviet support of Suez Canal nationalization and the offer of armed support in the ensuing crisis was accompanied by a wave of enthusiasm in the U.S.S.R. for Arab institutions and attitudes. This admiration slowly subsided, however, when the realization dawned that, beyond a willingness to maintain practical and friendly relations, Nasser's "positive neutralism" meant exactly what those words imply. As vigorous steps were taken to eradicate all traces of communism from the United Arab Republic, Soviet leaders frequently had to reappraise their Egyptian policy. By 1961, Cairo was warning Moscow that continued Soviet propaganda attacks would have "serious repercussions" on relations between the two countries, according to a leading daily newspaper:

They have been inclined to interpret our positive neutralism as some sort of alignment with their camp. In the light of this misconception, they have also imagined that they have the right to demand from us the price of submissive dependence.

This mood of petulance, which may have stemmed in part from Russia's very prompt recognition of recovered Syrian independence, in part from Soviet favor shown to the Kasim regime in Iraq, and in part from intimate relations between Presidents Nasser and Tito, did not last long. During most of the year 1962 deliveries in Egypt of Soviet bloc arms, planes and military equipment were such as to indicate a considerable degree of mutual understanding. Furthermore, the signing in June, 1962, of a three-year barter agreement and the speeding up of Soviet work on the Aswan High Dam suggested that Soviet-Egyptian relations had returned to a normal level of cooperation.

As with any chief of state who might essay to steer a non-aligned course in a world polarized by two unalterably opposed great power systems, President Nasser has experienced difficulties in navigation. Egypt's distinction in occupying a peculiarly strategic location relative to the world power contest has placed it under pressures and responsibilities of no mean order. President Nasser's task of trying to maintain acceptable relationships with

both power blocs, while attempting to keep his own image bright among the Arab peoples and the emerging nations of Africa, is a very exacting one, indeed. It would be a challenging task under any circumstances. Considering the existing handicaps—an assorted, indigent, crowded Egyptian population dependent on foreign aid for the hope of eventual economic viability, feuds with other Arab states and a state of war with Israel, and responsibility for administering a vital section of one of the world's principal highways—the task is staggering. If Nasser's guidance of his ship of state has seemed erratic, it may be recalled that in ten years of navigation, among perils domestic and foreign, he has avoided disaster. All things considered, it must be allowed that his has been a firm hand at the helm.

ETHIOPIA'S TROUBLED FUTURE

Continued from page 50

leaders of the revolt were Western-educated intellectuals and Imperial Guard officers who had been exposed to American institutions. On the other hand, it was also reported that American ammunition was used to crush the revolution and that the United States ambassador extended the Emperor's peace offer to the rebels. Perhaps a volume of *The Foreign Relations of the United States*, published, hopefully, about 1982, will throw light on these questions and on the reasons why the Emperor did not order wholesale executions. He announced that his son and heir-apparent, Crown Prince Asfa-Wossen Haile Selassie, had acted under "duress" when he participated in the revolt. The Emperor forgave his son and preserved for him his title of Crown Prince.

Pervading opinion aligned the United States government with the Emperor and the "old order." After Haile Selassie, what? I would hazard the guess that the death of the Emperor will result in turmoil ("after Caesar, chaos") in Ethiopia and the loss of a wily, astute neo-medieval monarch who is on "our side."

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of November, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Nov. 4—President John Kennedy reveals that the last in the series of atmospheric nuclear tests has been completed.

Nov. 5—81 of the United Nations ask the nuclear powers to stop all testing by January 1, 1963.

Nov. 14—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agree to resume disarmament talks November 26.

Nov. 21—It is reported from London that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev has told the British government he is willing to talk about a nuclear test ban.

Nov. 25—It is reported from Geneva that American sources say the U.S.S.R. is continuing its nuclear tests. Khrushchev promised to end the tests November 20.

Nov. 26—Arthur H. Dean, U.S. disarmament delegation head, reports "no apparent change" in the Russian position on disarmament, as the conference reconvenes.

European Economic Community

Nov. 22—At a special meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, the French Minister of Agriculture tells the U.S. that the Common Market does not intend to alter its agricultural policies. (See also *Gatt*.)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt)

Nov. 13—The 44-nation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) accepts Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic as provisional members.

Nov. 15—The U.S. informs the member nations of Gatt that its simplified tariff scheduled to go into effect January 1, 1963, has been postponed.

Nov. 16—Gatt members ask France to eliminate quantitative restrictions on some imports from the U.S.

Nov. 17—Gatt warns that the Common Market might dictate the terms of world trade in agricultural commodities. The U.S. has also criticized the agricultural policies of the Common Market. (See *International, European Economic Community*.)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nov. 1—General Lauris Norstad turns over U.S. command functions to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer but retains Supreme Command of Allied Forces in Europe until January, because of the Cuban situation.

Nov. 12—General Norstad says Nato forces suffer critical shortages.

Nov. 16—U.S. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball says that Nato's most urgent need is conventional arms.

United Nations

(See also *Congo*.)

Nov. 4—Acting Secretary General U Thant reveals he will consult Security Council members about a conference on the Cuban crisis.

Nov. 7—Voting 92 to 0 with 7 abstentions and 11 nations not recorded as voting, the General Assembly approves an international convention protecting human rights in marriage relations.

Nov. 9—Uganda becomes the 112th nation to join the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco).

Nov. 17—Budget difficulties deadlock the Paris meetings of Unesco.

Nov. 23—Russia becomes the 40th nation to

sign the International Coffee Agreement, designed to stabilize conditions for coffee sale in the world market.

Nov. 28—The U.S.S.R. agrees that the election of U Thant as U.N. Secretary General should not hinge on a Cuban settlement.

Nov. 29—The General Assembly approves a measure limiting attendance at the Third Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to members of the U.N., thus excluding Communist China. India joins in approving the measure.

Nov. 30—U Thant is unanimously elected Secretary General by the General Assembly on unanimous recommendation of the 11-member Security Council.

ALGERIA

Nov. 9—Premier Ben Bella, addressing crowds in Setif, declares that the Evian accords signed in March, 1962, need revision.

Nov. 15—Mohammed Boudiaf, one of the 9 original leaders of the Algerian war, resigns from the National Assembly.

Nov. 24—Foreign Minister Mohammed Khemisti, in the National Assembly's first debate on foreign policy, declares that Algeria is committed to a policy of neutralism and "healthy cooperation" with France.

Nov. 29—Minister of Information Mohammed Hadj-Hamou announces that the Communist party is banned.

AUSTRIA

Nov. 18—Austrians vote for a new federal parliament.

Nov. 19—Election returns give the Conservative People's party an additional 2 seats in the parliament for a total of 81. The Socialist party loses 2 seats, winning 76.

Nov. 20—Chancellor Alfons Gorbach (People's Party) delivers his resignation to President Adolf Schaerf so that a new cabinet may be organized. Gorbach's cabinet will serve as a caretaker government.

BRAZIL

Nov. 30—After eight attempts have failed to confirm him, 164 Deputies, the minimum

necessary vote in the Chamber, confirm Hermes Lima as Premier.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

Nov. 6—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's minority Conservative government maintains control after the seventh consecutive vote of no confidence fails to defeat the government.

Nov. 14—Premier Jean Lesage's Liberal party wins in Quebec's provincial election.

Nov. 19—The Liberal party victory in Newfoundland's election returns Premier Joseph Smallwood to power for a fifth term.

Great Britain

Nov. 8—Thomas G. D. Galbraith resigns as Joint Under Secretary for Scotland on the grounds that he has "become an embarrassment" in an investigation into the espionage activities of William J. C. Vassall, an Admiralty clerk who was a spy for the U.S.S.R. The Government has revealed that Galbraith wrote letters to Vassall while Galbraith was Civil Lord of the Admiralty.

Nov. 14—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan names Lord Radcliffe to head a tribunal to investigate accusations of treason and immorality in the Admiralty.

Nov. 22—Two parliamentary seats are won by the Labor party in Glasgow and South Dorset by-elections.

India

Nov. 7—V. K. Krishna Menon's resignation from the Cabinet is accepted by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Nov. 15—Nagas hill tribesmen offer to end their rebellion and fight the Chinese if Nehru will hold a plebiscite on their independence.

Nov. 18—India reveals that her forces are retreating in the face of a massive Chinese attack.

Nov. 19—Chinese Premier Chou En-lai warns that U.S. aid to India will enlarge the conflict.

Nehru asks President Kennedy for further military aid.

Chinese troops threaten the Assam plains as their drive continues.

Nov. 21—The U.S. reveals it is sending 12 turbojet transport planes with U.S. crews to help India fight China.

China reveals it is ordering a cease fire all along the Indian border effective at midnight.

India arrests more than 200 Indian Communists.

Nov. 22—Fighting ceases on the Indian frontier.

Nov. 23—U.S. and British experts consult with the Indian government about India's military needs.

Nov. 29—In Rawalpindi, it is announced that Nehru and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan have signed an agreement to negotiate the 15-year old Kashmir dispute.

Nov. 30—It is reported in Pakistan that Nehru has told Parliament it would be "very harmful" to alter present arrangements in Kashmir.

Pakistan

(See also *India*, Nov. 29.)

Nov. 7—President Mohammad Ayub Khan reveals he has called an emergency session of the National Assembly to consider the Indo-Chinese border war.

Nov. 21—At a closed meeting of the National Assembly, Ayub Khan is reported to have discussed a more neutral policy for Pakistan.

Nov. 28—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman arrives in Rawalpindi to ask Pakistani support against the Communist threat to South Asia.

Tanganyika

Nov. 8—Prime Minister Julius Nyerere wins 1,123,553 votes; Zuberi Mtemvu wins 21,279 votes in the presidential election that began November 1; Nyerere will take over as the nation's first President December 9.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

Nov. 6—As the constitutional conference ends in deadlock, the date for independence for British Guiana is not set. Basic disagreement continues between leftist Prime Minister Cheddi B. Jagan and the opposition party leaders over proportional representation and the timing of new elections.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Nov. 12—The Constitutional Conference on Nyasaland opens in London.

Nov. 22—Britain and Nyasaland reach agreement on a new constitution giving home rule within the Federation to Nyasaland. Hastings Kamuzu Banda will be Nyasaland's first prime minister.

Nov. 24—The Constitutional Conference on Nyasaland ends in London. The majority party in Nyasaland, the Malawi Congress party, plans to take Nyasaland out of the Federation as soon as it becomes independent.

Kenya

Nov. 17—The British government names Malcolm MacDonald Governor of Kenya, succeeding Sir Patrick Renison.

BULGARIA

Nov. 5—The Communist party of Bulgaria announces that Premier Anton Yugov and 6 other leaders have been removed from the Central Committee. The First Secretary of the Communist party, Todor Zhivkov, makes the announcement at the opening of the eighth party congress.

Nov. 11—President of the Presidium of the National Assembly Dimitur Ganev announces that a new constitution will be drawn up shortly.

Nov. 14—The party congress re-elects a new Politburo and Central Committee. In the new Central Committee, 27 members of the old 88-man committee are excluded. The new central committee is composed of

101 members. The congress also re-elects Zhivkov to the post of first secretary. The congress adjourns.

Nov. 19—It is reported from Sofia that the National Assembly has voted Zhivkov in as premier.

CHINA

(See also *British Commonwealth, India.*)

Nov. 9—*Jenmin Jih Pao* announces that a new program to mechanize and modernize Chinese agriculture has been given priority. The appointment of several agricultural experts to the State Planning Commission is announced also.

Nov. 16—Chinese Communist troops battle Indian soldiers in Walong, in India's North East Frontier Agency.

Nov. 21—At midnight a cease-fire proposed by Communist China in its fighting with India becomes effective.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Nov. 5—Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko warns that unless the U.N. and the U.S. exert pressure to reunite the Congo, the nation may become "another Korea."

Nov. 6—Diplomatic sources report that U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant has set November 15 as the deadline for President Moishe Tshombe of Katanga Province to end his secessionist tactics.

Nov. 11—It is announced that U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee will visit the Congo to try to effect a settlement between the Congolese government and secessionist Katanga Province.

It is reported that Katanganese planes bombed several villages in north Katanga yesterday.

Nov. 12—The U.N. Command in the Congo issues an order to U.N. planes to open counterattacks against Kantanganese bombing missions.

Nov. 15—In Belgium, McGhee meets with Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak to discuss the Congo crisis.

Nov. 23—Sources report that the powerful mining interests in Katanga have expressed their willingness to pay export duties and royalties to the central government. Heretofore the payments have been made to Katanga province.

It is reported that U Thant has abandoned his proposal to seek a boycott on purchases of copper and cobalt from Katanga. It is also revealed that the U.S. and Britain oppose economic sanctions.

Nov. 27—After a meeting between U.S. President Kennedy and Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, the White House issues a warning that "severe measures" will be taken against Katanga province unless it ends its secession.

Nov. 28—After a 5-hour debate the Opposition members in the Congo's Chamber of Deputies fail to muster the necessary two-thirds approval for a no-confidence vote in the government of Premier Cyrille Adoula. The vote is 59-47 with 2 abstentions.

Reliable sources report that the U.S. and Belgium have submitted to U Thant their proposal to increase pressure on Katanga Province to force it to end its secession.

Nov. 29—U.N. Representative to the Congo Robert K. A. Gardiner delivers a report to the Security Council in which he warns that Katanga Province will face economic pressures unless Tshombe agrees to a proposed federal constitution.

CUBA

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy.*)

Nov. 2—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, arrives in Cuba to discuss the dismantling of Soviet missiles.

Nov. 7—in a cable message to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro insists that the U.S. accept his 5 demands, including the evacuation of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, before a settlement.

Nov. 8—At the U.N., Cuba tells its members that Soviet bombers in Cuba belong to Cuba, and will not be removed from Cuban soil. U. S. and Soviet representatives at

the U.N. meet to discuss the U.S. demand that the bombers be removed.

Nov. 26—Mikoyan leaves for New York after a 24-day visit.

The government press reveals that Cuba will permit U.N. inspectors to verify the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuban soil if the U.S. will agree to U.N. inspection on U.S. soil of dismantled bases for training anti-Castro "mercenaries" and "terrorists."

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Nov. 14—Joaquin Balaguer, ex-President under General Trujillo, is banned from returning to the Dominican Republic. He is in exile in New York.

FRANCE

Nov. 6—The Constitutional Council refuses to rule on the legality of the constitutional referendum last month to provide for popular election of the president. The President of the French Senate, Gaston Monnerville, has challenged the referendum in a letter to the 11-man Council.

Nov. 7—In a radio-television address, de Gaulle urges French voters to elect men to parliament who will support his "political renovation" policy. Elections for a new National Assembly are scheduled for November 18 and November 25.

Nov. 18—French voters cast ballots for a new 482-man National Assembly.

Nov. 19—Final returns show a large victory for de Gaulle's Gaullist Union for the New Republic and its allies. On the first round of balloting, some 96 candidates won absolute majorities as required; of this number, 63 are Gaullists. Of the total votes cast, Gaullist candidates received approximately one-third of the total votes (never before in "modern French history" has any party received over one-fourth of the total vote). The Communist candidates ran second, winning about 22 per cent of the total vote.

Nov. 22—René Coty, President of the Fourth French Republic, dies.

Nov. 25—Run-off balloting is held in 369 districts where candidates failed to receive ab-

solute majorities on the first round of voting.

Nov. 26—It is announced that Gaullist candidates have won a majority of 263 seats in the National Assembly's House of Deputies (lower house). The two leading Gaullist groups, Union for the New Republic and the Democratic Union of Labor (left-wing Gaullists) together won 233 seats. The Socialists won 66 seats, and the Communists, 41.

Nov. 27—President de Gaulle names Georges Pompidou as premier.

Nov. 28—De Gaulle commutes the death penalty for former General Edmond Jouhaud and businessman André Canal to life imprisonment. They are imprisoned for taking active roles in the Algerian war.

GERMANY, WEST

Nov. 2—The Free Democratic party's executive and parliamentary group lists several conditions for remaining in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's coalition government. Adenauer is given until Monday, November 5, to agree to these conditions, which include the dismissal of 2 state secretaries. The 2 state secretaries are charged by the Free Democrats with having withheld information from Justice Minister Wolfgang Stammberger concerning the police action against the weekly *Der Spiegel*. *Der Spiegel* is charged with having printed defense secrets on German military preparedness. The editors and publisher are in jail, facing treason charges.

Nov. 5—After day-long conferences between the Free Democrats and the Christian Democratic Union, Adenauer agrees to the Free Democrats' demands for the dismissal of State Secretary in the Justice Ministry Walter Strauss and to an indefinite leave for State Secretary in the Defense Ministry Volkmar Hopf. Justice Minister Stammberger (Free Democrat) withdraws his resignation.

Nov. 12—In elections to the parliament for the State of Hesse, the Christian Democratic Union loses 4 seats. The Social

Democrats win 51 of the 96 seats, a gain of 3.

Nov. 13—Chancellor Adenauer arrives in Washington for talks with U.S. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Nov. 14—At a meeting of the Free Democrats' parliamentary group it is decided to withdraw from the coalition government unless Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss is ousted.

Nov. 17—In Bonn, Adenauer meets with the Free Democrats. He refuses to dismiss Strauss.

Nov. 19—A communiqué issued by the Free Democrats' executive and parliamentary group authorizes the resignations of the 5 Free Democratic ministers in Adenauer's cabinet. The Free Democrats declare that they are willing to join in another coalition government "free . . . of personalities."

Nov. 20—It is reported that the C.D.U.'s executive has discovered a means to end the government crisis. The remaining ministers will resign to allow Adenauer to re-organize his government completely, without assigning a post to Strauss.

Nov. 26—In the Bavarian state election yesterday, unofficial returns reveal that the Christian Social Union (an autonomous affiliate of the C.D.U. under Chairman Franz Josef Strauss), has won a majority.

Nov. 27—At a caucus of the parliamentary groups of the C.D.U. and the C.S.U., Adenauer is asked to set a date for his retirement. He refuses, but declares that he does not want to fight in the 1965 election.

Nov. 28—Adenauer tells the executive meeting of his party that he has agreed to accept the Free Democrats' demand to exclude Strauss from the new government.

Nov. 29—The C.D.U. and C.S.U.'s joint executive issue a communiqué interpreted to mean that Strauss will not be given a cabinet post. Strauss later declares that he does not wish to be in the Cabinet.

GUATEMALA

Nov. 25—Rebel units of the air force attack

barracks and police headquarters in Guatemala city and the presidential palace. Troops loyal to President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes crush the revolt.

HUNGARY

Nov. 21—Premier Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) party, opens the eighth party congress.

Nov. 24—The party congress ends. Kadar is re-elected first secretary.

ITALY

Nov. 12—The National Council of the Christian Democratic party, a member of the coalition government with Democratic Socialists and Republicans, votes its confidence in the government. The council also approves an order authorizing the government to give governmental responsibilities to the left-wing Socialists under Pietro Nenni.

LAOS

Nov. 7—Premier Souvanna Phouma declares that he will resign unless the situation improves. He declares that both "the Right and the Left factions" have created "great difficulties."

MOROCCO

Nov. 18—King Hassan II announces a draft of a new constitution that will be presented to the voters. The constitution declares Morocco is "A democratic, social monarchy"; it provides for a bicameral parliament and a premier responsible to the King.

Nov. 19—It is revealed that the constitutional referendum will be held on December 7, 1962.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Nov. 28—Princess Wilhelmina, 82, dies. She ruled 50 years, giving up the throne in favor of her daughter, Juliana, in 1948.

POLAND

Nov. 27—The Parliament receives the 1963 economic plan and budget, providing an austerity program to improve Poland's adverse foreign exchange balance. Poland's intensive industrialization program will be sharply cut.

RYUKYU ISLANDS

Nov. 12—The results of yesterday's elections for the 29-member legislature are revealed. The pro-United States Liberal Democratic party has won 17 seats.

SAUDI ARABIA

Nov. 6—The premier of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Faisal, announces that slavery is outlawed; all slaves are free.

Saudi Arabia charges that U.A.R. planes have bombed Saudi Arabian villages near the Yemen border. The U.A.R. is cooperating with the revolutionary government in Yemen. Saudi Arabia cancels diplomatic ties with the U. A. R. (See also *Yemen*.)

SOMALIA REPUBLIC

Nov. 5—The Somalia National League boycotts the parliament and refuses to join in a newly constituted coalition cabinet.

Nov. 7—Premier Abdi Rashid Shermarke announces a cabinet re-shuffle.

SOUTH AFRICA

Nov. 6—The U.N. General Assembly approves a resolution urging members to impose economic sanctions against South Africa and to break off diplomatic ties.

Nov. 22—In a race riot in Paarl (35 miles from Capetown), 100 Africans attack and kill 2 whites.

Nov. 30—Police arrest 300 Africans in the African section of Paarl.

THAILAND

Nov. 24—The withdrawal of the 2,300 U. S. soldiers in Thailand begins.

U.S.S.R., THE

Nov. 2—The U.S.S.R. announces that it has launched a one-ton space vehicle toward Mars, which will relay photographs of the planet to earth. The vehicle should reach Mars in June, 1963.

Nov. 4—The Soviet Union asks the U.S. to recall a member of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, charged with spying activities.

Nov. 9—The U.S. Pentagon reports that U.S. naval vessels have drawn alongside Soviet freighters out of Havana to verify the removal of Soviet military missiles. (See also *Cuba* and *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

It is announced that a plenary meeting of the Central Committee to discuss strengthening the party's control over the economy is scheduled for November 19.

Nov. 11—A parade in Red Square is held to commemorate the forty-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. A new piece of equipment, a 50-foot underseas rocket, is displayed.

Nov. 19—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev speaks for over 5 hours at the opening of the Communist Party's Central Committee meeting. He outlines a reorganization of the industrial and agricultural sectors. Henceforth, there will be two separate administrations of the economy, one to regulate industry, the other to regulate agriculture.

Nov. 21—The Soviet Union announces that the state of alert called for Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces because of the Cuban crisis has ended.

Speakers at the Central Committee meeting call for an increase in the production of consumer goods.

Nov. 23—Chairman of the State Planning Committee Veniamin E. Dymshits tells the Central Committee that agriculture will receive 12 per cent (some \$4.4 billion) of the government's funds for economic development in 1963. At its closing session, the Central Committee names several of Khrushchev's protégés to important party jobs, and approves the reorganization of agriculture and industry as a dual hierarchy.

The Committee of the Party-Government Control, which will investigate economic malpractices, will be headed by Aleksandr N. Shelepin.

Nov. 24—The government abolishes the State Planning Commission, and replaces it with the Council of the National Economy headed by Dymshits. In addition to having control over economic plans, the new agency will also have "administrative powers."

THE UNITED STATES

The Economy

Nov. 13—The Bureau of the Budget estimates that the 1963 federal budget will show a \$7.8 billion deficit; revenue is \$7.1 billion under the administration's original estimate.

Nov. 15—Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, predicts a "significant" tax reduction in the Administration's 1963 tax program.

Nov. 19—The President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy suggests a "prompt and significant" reduction in personal and corporate income tax rates.

Foreign Policy

Nov. 1—All officials of the State Department are ordered to report all news interviews and their contents to a central office.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro says Cuba rejects any form of international inspection on the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.

Nov. 2—President Kennedy reports by radio and television that the Soviet missile bases in Cuba are being dismantled.

Nov. 5—The U.S. and Japan agree to cooperate in using experimental communication satellites to relay radio signals across the Pacific.

Nov. 7—Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev says all Russian rockets have been withdrawn from Cuba.

The U.S. announces that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. have agreed that U.S. naval vessels will verify the withdrawal of Russian missiles from Cuba by counting them at sea.

Nov. 8—The Defense Department says all known offensive missile bases in Cuba have been dismantled.

Nov. 10—The resignation of Fowler Hamilton as head of the Agency for International Development is revealed.

Nov. 14—The President confers with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Washington.

Nov. 15—Adenauer urges the U.S. to deal more firmly with the U.S.S.R.

Castro threatens to shoot down U.S. aerial reconnaissance planes.

Nov. 16—The U.S. pledges to defend aerial reconnaissance planes; the flights will continue until a better method is devised for checking on Castro's offensive military buildup.

Nov. 17—Three pro-Castro Cubans are arrested in the U.S. and charged with sabotage conspiracy.

Nov. 19—The Inter-American Development Bank reveals it has loaned \$16.8 million to Venezuela and Uruguay.

Nov. 20—The President reveals he has ordered an end to the naval blockade of Cuba, after a pledge from Khrushchev to remove all Russian jet bombers within 30 days.

Nov. 21—Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs W. Averell Harriman leaves for India to evaluate Indian needs for the war against China.

Budget Director David E. Bell is named foreign aid administrator; Kermit Gordon succeeds Bell as Budget Director.

Nov. 27—The White House announces that President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan will meet in the Bahamas December 19 and 20.

The Somalia Republic's Premier, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, lunches with President Kennedy at the White House.

The Department of State rescinds the order to officials to report all news interviews and their contents.

Nov. 29—The President and Anastas I. Mikoyan, Soviet First Deputy Premier, confer for several hours.

Nov. 30—President Kennedy confers with the

President of Honduras, Ramon Villeda Morales.

The White House announces that the President plans to visit Costa Rica in February or March, 1963, to confer with Central American leaders.

The President tightens restrictions on imports of oil.

Government

Nov. 7—Billie Sol Estes is found guilty of swindling and is sentenced to 8 years in state prison.

Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of the late President Franklin Roosevelt, dies.

The President announces that he plans to name Christian A. Herter as chief planner and foreign trade negotiator for the Government.

Nov. 16—A federal court orders the Post Office Department to halt the sale of a million deliberately misprinted stamps; the restraining order has been secured by the man who holds 50 of the original 400 misprints.

Nov. 19—President Kennedy announces that in January Major General James H. Polk will take the place of Major General Albert Watson 2d. commanding U.S. forces in Berlin.

Nov. 20—The President holds his first press conference since September 13.

Nov. 21—A federal order countering discrimination in housing becomes effective.

Nov. 22—The President orders the Veterans Administration to mail out life insurance dividend checks to veterans in January instead of disbursing the funds in the course of the entire year.

The President reappoints Robert Morgenthau as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York state.

Nov. 29—In a case involving reapportionment in Virginia, a 3-judge federal court rules that "substantially equal representation" in both houses of a state legislature is guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution. Districts in Virginia must be reapportioned by January 31, 1963.

Labor

Nov. 8—The strike against *The New York Daily News* ends; it began November 1.

Nov. 12—George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., and Walter Reuther, head of the United Automobile Workers of America, agree to work out a solution to their disagreement over a vacant post on the 29-member Executive Council.

Nov. 15—Officers of 100 national unions sign pledges at the White House "to eliminate discrimination and unfair practices" within labor's ranks.

Nov. 28—The President acts under the Taft-Hartley Act to investigate the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation strike involving the International Association of Machinists, who are demanding a vote by employees on the issue of a union shop.

A U.S. Court of Appeals rules that railroads may make changes in work rules, rejecting a request for an injunction against the rule changes by 5 operating brotherhoods.

Nov. 29—At government request, strikers return to work at Lockheed.

Military Policy

Nov. 13—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration names Major L. Gordon Cooper as astronaut for the next Mercury flight scheduled for April, 1963.

Nov. 21—The Department of Defense orders 14,200 Air Force reservists released at once; the special Strategic Air Command alert is ended.

Politics

Nov. 5—Former Vice-President Richard Nixon appears on television on the eve of the election to attack Governor Edmund (Pat) Brown for "smears" against him and his family.

Nov. 6—More than 50 million Americans vote in the midterm elections. The Democrats gain 4 Senate seats; the new Senate will seat 68 Democrats and 32 Republicans. In the elections for the House, 257 Democrats and 176 Republicans are elected (plus

two seats in doubt, in Alaska and California.) Republican gubernatorial victories are assured in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. Richard Nixon loses to incumbent Democratic Governor Brown in California. In 35 governorship contests, 12 incumbents are defeated (including 6 Republicans and 6 Democrats).

Nov. 7—Richard Nixon attacks the press in a press conference as he concedes defeat.

Nov. 29—The Minnesota Canvassing Board announces that Republican Governor Elmer L. Andersen has been reelected by a 142-vote margin; the Board has reassembled and reviewed the vote. The Democratic-Farmer-Labor challenger, Lieutenant Governor Karl F. Rolvaag, says he will ask for a recount.

Segregation

Nov. 15—A federal appeals court orders the Department of Justice to bring criminal contempt proceedings against Mississippi Governor Ross R. Barnett and his Lieutenant Governor, Paul B. Johnson, Jr.

Nov. 16—A grand jury in LaFayette County, Mississippi, charges that Chief U.S. Marshal James P. McShane deliberately incited the Oxford, Mississippi, riot of September 30, when he ordered the use of tear gas.

Nov. 20—By Executive Order, President Kennedy orders federal agencies to take "all necessary and appropriate action" to end racial or religious discrimination in housing built or purchased with federal aid.

Nov. 21—James McShane surrenders on a warrant charging him with inciting riots at Oxford, Mississippi, September 30-October 1.

Supreme Court

Nov. 5—The Court rules unanimously that it is illegal for a motion picture distributor to force a television station to buy a package of films to get the good films it wants; this "block booking" violates Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

URUGUAY

Nov. 25—Uruguay voters cast their ballots for the Congress and for provincial and municipal officers.

VATICAN, THE

Nov. 4—Pope John XXIII celebrates the fourth year of his coronation. The more than 2,000 prelates at the Ecumenical Council pay tribute.

Nov. 13—A papal decree is announced altering the canon, the most solemn section of the mass. The change inserts St. Joseph's name after that of the Virgin Mary.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Nov. 20—Some 50 helicopters, including U.S. craft, are used to transport about 800 troops in an offensive against Communist guerrillas.

Nov. 25—Viet Cong (pro-Communist) guerrillas attack 2 government outposts. Some 109 guerrillas are reported dead following battles with government troops.

YEMEN

Nov. 2—The revolutionary government announces over the Sana radio that Yemen is massing troops on the Saudi Arabian frontier because Saudi Arabia and Jordan have attempted to invade Yemen in the last few days.

Nov. 10—An interview with 16 foreign correspondents in northeast Yemen is given by Imam Mohamad al Badr, allegedly killed by the rebels. He asks help in saving Yemen from the U.A.R.

Nov. 11—It is announced that the U.A.R. and Yemen have approved a military defense treaty.

Nov. 25—Diplomatic sources report that U.S. President Kennedy has sent letters to Middle East leaders outlining a proposal to end the Yemen crisis; the first step is the withdrawal of U.A.R. forces and the abandonment of Saudi and Jordanian support for the royalist faction.

Nov. 28—Premier Faisal of Saudi Arabia rejects the Kennedy peace proposal.

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